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1. 0 INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY
 
1. 1 STUDY OBJECTIVES AND TASKS
 
The objectives of this study are twofold. The first objective is to determine the effect of 
utilizing the Space Shuttle upon the cost of the OAO/LST point design spacecraft. The second 
objective is to determine the effects of utilization of the Space Shuttle upon the mission objec­
tives and operational modes of the OAO/LST program. 
In order to satisfy these objectives, the following study tasks were undertaken: 
1. 	 The baseline costs of the OAO/LST point design for the Titan launched program 
were established. 
2. 	 The effects of the Space Shuttle on these baseline costs were identified and 
assessed.
 
3. 	 The interrelationships between Shuttle utilization, useful observing time, and 
OAO/LST program costs were identified and parametrically evaluated. 
4. 	 Total program costs for comparative OAO/LST programs with and without the 
Shuttle were developed. 
1.2 	 STUDY GROUND RULES 
The following major study ground rules served as basic assumptions for the study (a more 
detailed listing of study guidelines and constraints is contained in Section 2 of this report). 
1. 	 Use the GSFC "STAR" design for the 120-inch LST design baseline. 
2. 	 Assume the shuttle will be available post 1977. 
3. 	 Assume a shuttle payload capability of 15' x 60' volume with 30, 000 pounds 
delivered into a 400 N. M 350 orbit. 
4. 	 Assume shuttle environment not to exceed conventional launch vehicle operation ­
retain Titan launch capability. 
5. 	 Assume shuttle fleet frequency will be designed to meet the OAO/LST mission 
model. 
6. 	 Use comparable mission models for the Titan and Shuttle based programs as 
required by the scientific objectives. 
7. 	 Use of identical spacecraft for each program except for experiment/telescope 
changes. 
Using these groundrules the study has involved, as one major program element, the gen­
eration of a complete cost model of an OAO/LST based on the GSFC point design spacecraft 
and launched in what has been considered until now the conventional manner employing an 
expendable booster, the Titan UI-D7. This baseline cost model has undergone several 
iterations based on possible changes resulting from the introduction of the concept of an 
Earth Orbital Shuttle (EOS) available for initial launch, deployment, resupply, and retrieval. 
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The effects of this EOS availability on the design and operation of the OAO/LST spacecraft 
and the resultant sensitivity to program costs has been presented. 
1.3 LARGE SPACE TELESCOPE OBJECTIVES 
The report "Scientific Uses of the Large Space Telescope", released by the Space Science 
Board of the National Academy of Sciences in the Fall of 1969 outlines the objectives of 
space astronomy through the 80's and emphasizes that the needs of the scientific community 
can no longer be met without providing an LST capability on a continuing basis. This report 
also provides guidelines for the design of the LST optical system. This guideline has been 
used in the OAO/LST baseline design. The Astronomy Missions Board in their position 
paper, "A Long-Range Program in Space Astronomy" published in July 1969, also recom­
mends that a 3 meter large space telescope program be incorporated in planning for the mid 
1970's. The AMB report additionally recommends that the LST be evolutionary from the 
current OAO program. The use of OAO developed subsystems to accomplish the LST mission 
satisfies the AMB recommendation. 
In 	summary, the objectives of the Large Space Telescope are: 
* Extend space astronomy observation capability from 1 meter to 3 meter to examine: 
* 	 Scale and curvature of universe 
* Evolution of galaxies and quasars
 
" Density and composition of interstellar matter
 
* 	 Structure of asteroids and cometary nuclei 
* 	 Planetary atmospheric and surface structure 
* 	 Composition of stars in neighboring galaxies 
* 	 Physical nature of pulsars 
* 	 Maintain this capability for at least a decade to meet the continuous scientific 
requirements as stated by the National Academy of Sciences 
o 	 Be operated as a Multi-Instrumented National Space Observatory in conjunction with 
ground telescopes and expand participation of the scientific community to insure 
that the broadest scope of astronomy requirements will be met. 
1.4 OAO/LST PERFORMANCE COMPARISQN 
While ground-based observatories are limited in both resolution and wavelength by the 
obscuring effects of the earth's atmosphere, the success of the OAO program has provided 
astronomers with the tools for extensive investigation in the ultra-violet region of the 
spectrum. The orbiting of diffraction-limited optics, of 3 meter aperture in the LST, will 
represent as significant an increase in faint limiting magnitude and accompanying 
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improvement in angular and spectral resolution as the construction of the Mt. Wilson and 
Palomar facilities did for ground-based observation. It is also important to note that the 
technical requirements demanded by the LST represent a logical extension of the capabilities 
developed on the NASA OAO program. These requirements are compared with the OAO 
Program in the following table. 
Table 1-1. OAO/LST Performance Comparison 
Ground 
Characteristics Based OAO-2 OAO-B OAO-C LST 
1 - 16 inch 
Aperture 200 inch 4 - 8 inch 38 inch 32 inch 120 inch 
3ooA - 1100A - nook - 950k - 1OOOk -
Wavelength 10,ooo 4000A 4000A 	 3300A 300,000A 
Plus X-Ray 
Guidance ±0.5 Arc Sec ±3 Arc Sec +0.25 Arc Sec +0.03 Arc See ±0. 004 Arc Sec 
Stability 
Limiting Star 23 10 14 7 29 
Magnitude 
Instrumentation IR Ultra-violet Ultra-violet Far Ultra-violet IR 
Visible X-Ray Visible 
Ultra-violet 
8 Ft Dia 12 Ft DiaSize 8 Ft Dia 8 Ft Dia 
10 Ft Length 10 Ft Length 10 Ft Length 45 Ft Length 
Weight - 4200 Lb 4700 Lb 	 4800 Lb 22,000 Lb 
1.5 SHUTTLE IMPACT ON OAO/LST 
This study has also evaluated the use of the Shuttle in a resupply mode and examined the 
economic influence that this mode would have on the overall program cost of the OAO/LST by 
considering the following areas: 
1. 	 Reduction in the number of OAO/LST's required by:
 
- Life extension through subsystem maintenance
 
- Avoiding obsolescence by instrumentation update
 
2. 	 Reduction in the cost of building space hardware since repair capability allows 
lower MTTF's. 
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3. 	 Elimination of redundant equipments except as required to guarantee resupply 
capability. 
4. 	 Reduction in the number of spares by retrieval and refurbishment of returned 
subsystems. 
The results of this study impact directly in the areas shown in Figure 1-1, each of which has 
been broken down into greater levels of detail in this report. In all of the detailed areas, 
designs and operational plans have been tailored to suit the requirements of cost drivers 
identified and quantized in this study. 
1.6 STUDY RESULTS 
The results of the study, comparing OAO/LST program costs with and without shuttle, are 
summarized in Figure 1-2. These costs reflect a program for continuing astronomy as 
discussed in paragraph 1. 3 and represent 6 spacecraft and 6 Titan launches for the baseline 
program with 3 spacecraft with 1 Titan and 2 Shuttle launches with 3 additional Shuttle revisits 
for resupply and experiment changes for the economic comparison of the Shuttle program. 
Making these experiment changes with the Shuttle program represents a $91 million savings 
as compared to achieving the same degree of flexibility without the Shuttle. This savings is 
summarized in Figure 1-3. Comparing the two programs in Figure 1-4 shows that large 
amounts of additional uptime, or spacecraft operational time, is achieved with the Shuttle 
program for a small increment in increased costs compared with the large increase in costs 
required without the Shuttle to gain the same degree of uptime. 
Figure 1-5 compares the most important characteristics for the OAO/LST programs with 
and without the Shuttle. In all cases, the Shuttle enables a higher uptime, lower program 
cost, and a lower MTTF with its attendant reduction-in technological complexity and risk. 
Although the carpet plot analysis shown in detail in Section 5 shows that a minimum cost 
program is achieved with a 12 month MTTF satellite, or at current state of the art achieve­
ment for MTTF's, we have used a 24 month MTTF satellite for comparative purposes since 
this satellite will represent some degree of degraded performance and is more consistent 
with the resultant degraded performance that will accrue to the 36 month MTTF requirement 
for the OAO/LST program without the Shuttle. 
Figure 1-6 has been developed to show the relationship between Shuttle flight cost and the 
cost 	of increased satellite MTTF. Considering that each Shuttle revisit adds an increment 
of life equal to (1) MTTF, the cost of a Shuttle flight may then be compared to the cost of 
adding (1) MTTF through improved design and production. Since this means doubling the 
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Savings 
Shuttle, $M Titan, $M Total, $M % 
Spacecraft 368 503 137 21 
Launch Vehicles - Titan 22.5 (1) 135 (6) 
- Shuttle 25.0 (5) 
Resupply Mech - Shuttle 24.5 
Subtotal 72.0 135 63 10 
Total 440 638 200 31 
Figure 1-2. OAO/LST Cost Savings with Shuttle 
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Without With 
Shuttle Shuttle 
Spacecraft 73.6 
Launch Vehicle 22.5 5.0 
Instrumentation 13.0 13.0 
Total $ 109.1 M $ 18.0 M 
Response Time 3 Yr Interval On Demand 
Cost Savings $ 91.0 M 
Figure 1-3. OAO/LST Experiment Change Cost Comparison 
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Figure 1-4. OAO/LST Cost Comparison With/W/O Shuttle 
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BASELINE PROGRAM 
WITHOUT SHUTTLE-PROGRAM ,COS$38 M 
UPTIME,; .JG9.5 Yrs 
MNI$4/65COs-
WITH SHUTTLE 
UTIME-i .. ' 11.3 Yrs 
75% 
COST FOR EQUAL UPTIME - 63% 
WITHOUT SHUTTLE $638 M 
WITH SHUTTLEI 1$440 M 
REQUIRED MTTF 
WITHOUT SHUTTLE3 YEARS 
WITH SHUTTLE1 2 YEARS 
Figure 1-5. OAO/LST Program Comparison 
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Figure 1-6. Cost Effectiveness of Shuttle Repair 
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MTTF, the cost to double MTTF was taken from the upper set of curves and plotted to pro­
duce the lower set. The addition of various Shuttle flight costs defines levels of MTTF above 
which use of the Shuttle is economically preferable, and below which improved MTTF through 
design is best. From Figure 1-6 it can be seen that the Shuttle revisit costs can approach 
$20 million before it becomes cost effective to improve MTTF through design. This is true 
regardless of whether we use a 1. 25 or a 1. 0 power slope. This analysis has shown that the 
Shuttle program can contribute a cost savings to future spacecraft design and development 
that goes far beyond the savings that accrue due to the low cost transportation provided. 
1. 7 STUDY CONCLUSIONS 
This study has identified several important economic advantages that will accrue to future 
scientific spacecraft programs that had not been realized before. In summary these are: 
* 	 Spacecraft savings of $1I7M 
* 	 Launch vehicle savings of $63M 
* 	 Program savings of $200M 
* 	 Shuttle allows experiment change for $91M savings 
* 	 Annual funding requirement comparable to OAO program 
* 	 Schedule delays of up to 6 -months due to Shuttle availability or turnaround time 
do not significantly affect OAO/LST Program costs 
* 	 Shuttle availability makes current spacecraft technology adequate for OAO/LST 
mission 
* 	 Shuttle flight cost can go to $20M before state-of-the-art MTtF improvements 
become cost effective for today's OAO-LST mission 
* 	 Tomorrow's mission requirements can be met with more cost effectiveness 
through Shuttle repair rather than design improvements for increased MTTF 
* 	 Shuttle availability minimizes uncertainties in OAO/LST performance and total 
program cost 
* 	 Low OAO/LST program sensitivity to Shuttle payload capacity 
* Increased science capability through instrumentation update
 
" Orbital resupply enables higher uptime ratios
 
* 	 Observation cost per year reduced 
* 	 The ability to repair failures allows the more demanding missions of the 1970's to 
be met with existing technology, thereby 
* 	 Allowing initial program estimates to be established with confidence at acceptable 
levels
 
" Preventing cost growth
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* Offering management options for cost reductions over prior experience by 
* 	 Reducing the number of missions required 
* 	 Reducing costs by lowering MTTF requirements 
* 	 Re-use of retrieved hardware 
" 	 Spacecraft program cost reductions of 27% are achieved for LST based upon existing 
technology 
* 	 Abort capability with Shuttle eliminates mission loss due to spacecraft or L/V 
failure 
1.8 STUDY RECOMMENDATIONS
 
This study has indicated that a more detailed future effort should be instituted that would
 
examine the economic impact of OAO/LST point design optimization utilizing the shuttle.
 
It is therefore recommended that the following tasks be pursued:
 
Task 1 Subsystem Level of Redundancy vs. Cost Optimization 
Task 2 Subsystem Level of Maintenance Optimization 
Task 3 System Dynamic Simulation - To Determine Impact of Design Guidelines 
Task 4 Assess Impact of Additional Cost Variables 
Task I will involve the use of a dynamic programming technique which will evaluate the 
possible combinations of cost and number of redundant units in each LST subsystem. The 
program will then select the subsystem design alternative or set of alternatives which pro­
duce the greatest probability of success for a given cost. 
Task 2 includes the analysis of cost versus the level, (module, blackbox, or subsystem) at 
which in-space maintaining will be performed. Various levels of maintenance for each LST 
subsystem will be investigated and their cost impact evaluated to insure that the LST is re­
supplied at the most cost effective level. 
Task 3 will involve an actual simulation of a 15 year LST mission under various resupply, 
delay, MTTF, level of redundancy, and level of maintenance conditions. This simulation 
will allow for a cost evaluation of the impact of sets of design guidelines simultaneously. 
Task 4 includes an in-depth assessment of the other cost elements as well as the variable 
costs which were previously assessed. The sensitivity of cost to reductions in MTTF or 
design life specifications will be quantitatively evaluated. This will include the reduction of 
design analysis, test and program schedule. The cost savings associated with retrieval and 
refurbishment, which should be of significance due to the large investment in spacecraft and 
telescope cost elements, will also be evaluated in this task. 
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2.0 BASELINE OAO/LST
 
2.1 THE BASELINE PROGRAMS AND COSTING GROUNDRULES 
The spacecraft used as a base for this study were based upon a Goddard supplied point design 
of the Large Space Telescope (LST). For the purposes of this study the Goddard designed 
spacecraft was used without any changes since it represents a logical step by step technical 
evolution from current OAO experience. The optimization of this design was not a study 
objective. This baseline design is the same as that introduced by Goddard in the June 1969 
presentation, "Space Astronomy at the Crossroads", with certain evolutions as developed 
by-the Goddard LST Project during the past year incorporated. 
Two baseline LST programs have been selected to provide a reference for evaluation of 
alternative options in order to assess the economic impact of the Shuttle (EOS) on the space 
astronomy mission over the next decade. The baseline program without shuttle utilizes 
conventional launch equipment, the Titan III D7 vehicle, with no provision for repair in orbit 
capability. For economic cost comparison, an alternative LST program has been evaluated 
with shuttle launch capability and comparable to the Titan program in experiment payload 
effectiveness and life in orbit. The two programs and their mission models are indicated 
in Figure 2-1. Spacecraft for the two programs were assumed to be identical. Experiment 
instrumentation varies for each flight. To meet the objectives of the Large Space Telescope 
program, as recommended by the National Academy of Science, requires a program for con­
tinuing astronomy as outlined in Figure 2-1. 
2.1. 1 OAO/LST - Without Shuttle 
This program comprises a six vehicle program with first launch in 1977, assuming a hard­
ware start in mid-1972. OAO technology has been used with the resultant reduction in 
development costs together with a projected moderate increase in unattended orbital life 
over present capability without large additional expenditures for an increase in mean time 
to failure (MTTF) of the vehicle as a whole. 
The first three vehicles in the program are on two year spacings, with expectation of tech­
nology improvement primarily in the telescope optics area. The latter three vehicles, on 
three year spacings, are expected to incorporate diffraction limited optics by building on the 
experience in orbit of the first three LST's. 
2-1 
Launch Yr. 75 76 77 79 81 84 87 90
 
WithoutShuttle 
Shuttle V 
* High Performance Optics 
3 Diffraction Limited Optics 
V Shuttle Flight for Instrument Change and Subsystem Refurbishment 
Figure 2-1. Alternate Approaches to Meet OAO/LST Objectives 
The astronomical experiment packages are considered to vary for each vehicle in the base­
line program. This will provide for updating of scientific instrumentation to keep the payload 
technology current, such as incorporating newly developed detectors, and for redesigned 
experiments to take advantage of new astronomical information gained from previous flights. 
2.1.2 OAO/LST - With Shuttle 
With the existence of the Shuttle, visitation in orbit for maintenance and update becomes 
possible. Three spacecraft are projected for this program instead of six as with the base­
line OAO/LST. The first launch of the shuttle program, however, is by Titan on the as­
sumption that the shuttle will not be operational prior to 1978. On the second launch, by 
shuttle, in-orbit check-out and adjustment of the LST optical system will be possible prior 
to its release from the shuttle. The experience of the first vehicle together with in-orbit 
testing insures that diffraction limited performance can be reached sooner than with the base­
line program. 
The Shuttle OAO/LST program matches the baseline program in orbital life and effectiveness 
for the purpose of comparing costs. The LST's have the same unattended life whether 
launched by Shuttle or Titan, and it is considered that a shuttle visit restores the LST or­
bital life expectation to its value at launch. Thus three shuttle visits to vehicles 2 and 3 
would produce the same uptime as with the six Titan launched vehicles, unattended. More­
over, the three visits combined with the three shuttle launched vehicles make six changes of 
experiment packages possible. In this way, the shuttle program may be considered equiva­
lent to the Titan program in scientific effectiveness. However, mission life specified for the 
Titanprogram includes degraded performance. 
The shuttle supported LST program can produce a large variation in both overall cost and 
effectiveness. A prime purpose of this study is to analyze these variations in a systematic 
way, in order to arrive at the most cost effective shuttle program. 
2.1.3 Costing Groundrules 
The groundrules for costing use 1970 constant dollars as the economic measure. A point 
design for the LST was provided by GSFC as the spacecraft cost baseline. For all flights, 
in each of the OAO/LST Program with and without the shuttle, the spacecraft subsystems 
and the telescope components are identical. 
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The point design cost is minimized by making maximum use of technology developed in the 
OAO program, particularly in the LST subsystems where much of the OAO technology is 
directly applicable. In this way, a major portion of the development costs invested in the 
OAO program are saved in the LST program. Specific areas of applicable OAO technology 
are discussed in the point design description. Much of the cost experience of the OAO pro­
gram is also applicable to the GSFC LST point design. As a result, the cost figures 
generated are on a much firmer ground than would otherwise be possible. Wherever 
applicable, the cost experience of the OAO is separately displayed for comparison with the 
LST estimated costs. 
In the production of the LST, major integration operations and systems testing will be per­
formed at Goddard. Integration will consist of flight hardware components of the vehicle in 
place. Emphasis will be placed on operation of primary optics and experiment packages 
with the spacecraft subsystems. Development integration will have been accomplished at 
the contractor facility, using simulated experiment interfaces as necessary. Major 
through-put acceptance testing, such as thermal-vacuum, will also be performed at Goddard. 
Contractors assistance will be furnished as required for the GSFC integration and test 
activities. 
A significant groundrule adopted for costing of the shuttle supported program was to free the 
LST from costly "man-rating" requirements as found in the man-attended and man-inhabited 
spacecraft programs. Accordingly, in orbit modular exchange on the shuttle supported LST 
is designed to be accomplished by a remote manipulator. In this way there will be no manned 
contact with the LST and therefore the design of the LST does not affect crew safety. 
Another advantage is the capability of the manipulator to handle modules far larger and 
heavier than a man could handle, even under weightless conditions. 
Numerous problems must also be solved in the development of a spaceworthy manipulator. 
The technique and mechanizations of precise positioning and holding of the modules in place 
on the LST is a major problem. A development cost for the remote manipulator of 
$25 million has been generated using GSFC supplied drawings and sketches and using LM 
and Apollo cost factors for precise mechanisms. This cost has been included as one of 
the economic factors in the shuttle program. 
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An 	important economic factor is the cost of shuttle service flights which is assumed as 
$5 million per flight. Variation of this figure is desirable since the actual cost is not yet 
known. Moreover the study will show that the OAO/LST Program has a low sensitivity to 
variation in shuttle flight costs. 
The general groundrules are summarized in Table 2-1, and shuttle-peculiar groundrules 
in Table 2-2. 
In addition, the following assumptions were made: 
" 	 The LST baseline design is provided by GSFC in the form of layout drawings, 
specifications, and analysis. Engineering effort is required for conversion of 
the design to detail drawings for manufacture. 
* 	 Spare parts will be provided on the premise that components of later flight articles 
in the program can serve as replacements in the earlier articles. Such components, 
if used, would be remanufactured or refurbished from the unsuitable earlier 
components. 
* 	 In the shuttle program, four sets of replaceable subsystem modules will be 
manufactured for the three flight articles, providing one spare set. Thus for 
two vehicles in space, two sets of modules will be on the ground, at least one of 
which will be ready for orbital replacement while the other is being repaired. 
* 	 The cost of repair, test and checkout of subsystem modules has not been costed. 
These modules will be repaired on a time and material contract as required 
* 	 Shuttle interface costs include a-hard line communications link from GSFC to MSC, 
as well as the data link from GSFC to the spacecraft. 
* 	 In both the Titan and Shuttle supported programs, the first vehicle to be manu­
factured will be a structural test article, subjected to development and qualifica­
tions testing. It will then be refurbished to comprise the last flight vehicle of the 
program. This philosophy also applies to subsystem and component levels. 
Table 2-1. OAO/LST Pricing Groundrules 
* 	 1970 Constant Dollars 
* 	 OAO/LST Baseline - Without Shuttle 
* 	 GSFC/LST Point Design 
* 	 Titan III D7 Launch Vehicle 
* 	 Integration & Test at GSFC - Contractor Support 
* 	 Spacecraft & Telescope Same for all Missions 
* 	 New Astronomical Instruments each Flight 
* 	 Pricing Based on OAO Cost Experience 
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Table 2-i. OAO/LST Pricing Groundrules (Cont.) 
* Telescope & Instrumentation Cost Supplied By GSFC 
" Maximum Use of OAO Equipment & Technology to Reduce Developmental Costs 
" Prototype Shop Operations - Centralized Facility 
Table 2-2. OAO/LST Pricing Groundrules - Shuttle 
* 	 No Manrating of LST Required 
* 	 25 M Development Cost for Remote Manipulator 
* 	 5 M Shuttle Operation Cost 
* 	 3 Additional Shittle Flights Required to provide 
Equivalent Science and Extended Life 
2.2 THE BASELINE DESIGN 
The point design for the LST, provided by GSFC, is illustrated in Figure 2-2. The vehicle 
is approximately 13 feet in diameter, 45 feet long, and weighs approximately 22, 000 lbs. It 
incorporates a Cassegrainian telescope arrangement, with a 120 in diameter primary mirror. 
The instrument compartment, behind the primary mirror, contains five separate instrument 
packages operating in the focal plane of the telescope. Four of the five are experiment 
groups for scientific information; the fifth is an offset tracker which is functionally part of 
the stabilization and control system. Each of these five packages is replaceable in orbit in 
the shuttle supported LST, but is permanently installed in the Titan version. 
Behind the instrument compartment is the spacecraft structure proper, housing the subsys­
tems serving the entire vehicle. These are four in number, each housed in a separate 
replaceable-in-orbit package, on an entire subsystem basis. The subsystems comprise the 
stabilization and control, communication and data handling, pneumatics, and electrical 
power. In the case of the Titan launched LST, the subsystems packages are permanently 
fastened in place. 
2.2. 1 Description of Baseline LST Structure 
The structural concept of the LST point design is shown in Figure 2-3. Detail descriptions 
of the individual structures are given in Ref. (1). Various concepts were examined and those 
chosen are briefly described below. Figure 2-3 shows the location of each structure in the 
total vehicle. 
Ref. (1.) 	 O'Connor, J. W., et al. "Structural Designs for a 120-Inch Diameter Advanced 
Orbiting Telescope" Goddard Space Flight Center Report X-284-70-147, April 1970. 
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GSFC has designed the structure of the LST for Titan III D-7 Launch, with a Viking shroud 
(150 in. 1.D. X 56 ft.) Qualification design loadings are: 
log Compression (Vertical Launch) 23 HZ 
5g Tension 
5g Lateral 5- 7 HZ 
The Titan g-loadings are within the above figures. 
The LST structure comprises five individual structures: (1) thermal shield, (2) secondary 
mirror support, (3) radial and on-axis instrument support, (4) primary mirror support, 
(5) spacecraft and transition ring structure. 
2.2.1.1 Thermal Shield 
The shield is a one-piece skin, of aluminum, with integral stiffening by machining from the 
solid. The skin remaining is .080 in., with stiffening longerons and rings extending approxi­
mately 1-1/2 inch internally. Heat pipes, circumferential only, are welded on the outside 
of the structure. The outer skin is silver backed teflon or ALZAK, as required. The weight 
of the shield is 1060 lbs. Further description is given in pp. 20-25 of Ref. (1). 
2.2.1.2 Secondary Mirror Support Structure - Figure 2-4 
The structure is a cylindrical shaped space truss, three hundred sixty (360) inches long and 
one hundred twenty nine (129) inches outside diameter. 
The member sizes are lightest at the upper (secondary mirror) end of the truss (left hand 
side of Figure 2-4) and increase in size toward the base end (near the primary mirror). 
This "tapering" of members has the advantages of both reducing the bending moment stress 
and reducing the weight of the structure. 
There are no discontinuous members in the truss. Lateral shear loads are carried by rings 
to truss points along the structure. Each member is a straight tube of circular cross sec­
tion within each bay. The member sizes range from three and one half (3-1/2) inches out­
side diameter at the base to one (1. 0) inch diameter at the upper end. The member wall 
thicknesses varied from 0.216 inches thick at the base to a 0. 140 inch thick wall at the upper 
end. Although circular cross-sectioned members are tentatively specified, rectangular 
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Figure 2-4. Secondary Mirror Support 6 Section Space Truss 
cross-sectioned members may be substituted to simplify intersections when joint details 
are designed.
 
The structure is all titanium (Ti-6AI-4V)and weighs 2400 lbs. 
2.2.1.3 Primary Mirror Support Structure - Figure 2-5 
The central design concept is that the primary mirror support points are to move downward 
in the same plane during launch acceleration so as not to deform the mirror (uniform deflec­
tion). The 27 mirror support points are held in air chucks during launch as shown in Fig­
ure 19, Reference (1). In orbit, these are released and another 6 energized. Three will be 
radial and three will be edge located. The three radial support points will be adjustable by 
piezo-electric stack drivers, described on P. 42 and Figure 21 of Reference 1, to compen­
sate for differential thermal expansion of the mirror and support. 
The structure has nine open trusses subtended about a central hub. The outboard end of each 
truss is supported by a deep circular support ring. Eighteen support points are mounted on 
each radial truss while the remaining nine support points are mounted on intermediate 
trusses. The unshaded small circles of Figure 2-5 indicate the support points for the mirror 
during launch while the dark shaded circles represent passive support points for the orbital 
phase of the mission. Lateralrestraintis offered by passive supports shown around the 
periphery of the large support ring. 
The structure is all titanium and weighs approximately 2300 lbs. The mirror support 
mechanism weighs approximately 400 lbs. 
2.2.1.4 Radial and On-Axis Instrument Structure - Figure 2-6 
This structure is all titanium and weighs 1300 lbs. The large baseplate is a thermal plate 
with circumferential heat pipes, designed to smooth out thermal gradients due to unequal 
heat loads from instrumentation. Further description of the structure is given on pp. 26-31 
of Reference (1). 
2.2.1.5 Spacecraft and Transition Ring Structure - Figure 2-7 
Concept "G" shows the structure in outline. The transition ring is a basic structure to which 
the telescope and experiments are attached at the forward end, the spacecraft structure at 
the aft end, and to which the launch interstage adapter connects. It is also a hard point for 
support in the shuttle, providing the required structural interface with the shuttle cargo bay. 
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Figure 2-7. Spacecraft and Transition Ring Structure 
The transition ring is essentially a circular hollow box beam, of titanium, fabricated as a 
weldment of hollow forgings. Its OD is 142 in., height is 12 in., and wall thickness 1/2 in. 
Its radial width is 7 in. , i.e. 128 in. ID, with a step down in height at 3 in. , inward from 
the OD. The weldment will have precision machined alignment surfaces. The weight of the 
ring is 1000 lbs. 
The "reference structure" (Figure 2-7) comprises four vertical elements or struts and a 
horizontal plate. The struts are 1/8 inch titanium sheets as outer sandwich skins, separated 
with titanium Z-bar reinforcing rods, forming a 3 inch thick sandwich section. The OD of 
the four struts is 108 inches; total height of the reference structure is 54 inches. Gusset 
plates are provided at top and bottom of the struts for attachment to the transition ring and 
the bottom plate. 
'The bottom plate, 108" OD, is a sandwich panel of titanium, four inches thick, with radial 
and diagonal stiffening channel elements. 
The "shell structure" (Figure 2-7) is an aluminum semi-monocoque design with internal 
longerons and circunferential stiffening rings extending to one inch radial thickness. The 
shell is 7-1/2 feet long and 54 inches OD. Four circumferential heat pipes are located on 
the outer skin, suitably spaced. The base plate is an aluminum sandwich structure similar 
to that of the reference structure base plate. Precision machined titanium rails are provided 
radially on the shell structure to receive the subsystem modules. The docking mechanism is 
attached at the underside of the shell base plate. Weight of reference and shell structures is 
1000 lbs., giving a combined weight of 2000 Ibs; for the spacecraft and transition ring struc­
ture, without the docking mechanism. 
The four subsystem module structures are aluminum truss frames 90 inches long, four feet 
wide and 18 inches deep. Each weighs 250 lbs, and will carry a latching mechanism for 
final positioning during replacement. 
In the case of the Titan launched LST structure the rails of the spacecraft structure and the 
latching mechanism of the module structures are eliminated. Permanent fastening of the 
modules is used instead, which is reflected in lower cost for the Titan version. 
2.2.1.6 Interstage Adapter for Titan Launch 
This structure is of aluminum semi-monocoque construction, with 1/8" thick skin and 1/8" 
high channel corrugations attached to outside surface for stiffening. The homogeneous, con­
tinuous cylinder is 110" indiameter and 14-1/2 ft. long, ihcluding a 1-1/2 ft. length for a snubber. 
The weight of the interstage adapter is 1000 lb. It is removed from the LST in deployment, 
by backing the orbit insertion stage away from the spacecraft. 
2-15 
Interface with the shuttle is combined with the remote manipulator as part of the service 
module described separately in this report. 
2.2.1.7 Structural Weight Summary of the LST 
ITEM WT. STRUCTURE WT. CONTENT 
Thermal Shield 1100 lb. 
- Piping-200 900 
- Sunshade -300 
- Solar Paddle -250 
- Thermal Blanket -150 
Secondary Mirror Support 
Structure 2400 
- Secondary Mirror and 
Mechanism 600 
Primary Mirror Support 
Structure 2300 
- Mirror Support Mech. 400 
Primary Mirror 5000 
Radial and On-Axis Instru­
ment Structure 1300 
- Offset Tracker 
Mirror -200 2400 
- Offset Tracker and 
Telescope Electronics -300* 
- Radial Instrument 
Pkges -900**
 
- On-Axis Instrument 
Pkge -1000**
 
Spacecraft and Transition 
Ring Structure 2000 
- Subsystem Module 1000 
Structures (Each 250 lb.) 
- Pneumatics Module 400 
Comm. and Data
 
- Handling Module 400
 
- Power Module 
 550 
- Stabilization and Control 
Module 1200 
- Smaller Details, Mechanical 400 
- Docking Mechanism (100) 
- Titan Interstage (1000) 
Total 
- 10,100 Structure 12,250 Content 
Total LST without docking mech. and interstage 22,350 lb. 
* Includes (1) 100 lb. titanium radial box 
** Includes (3) 100 lb. titanium radial boxes 
*** Includes (1) 200 lb. titanium axial box 
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2.2.2 Description of Experiments 
The experiment subsystem comprises three of the four radial packages and an on-axis 
package. The Offset Tracker, which is functionally part of the Stabilization and Control 
system, is located in the fourth radial package. 
2.2.2.1 On-Axis Experiments 
The on-axis experiment package is cylindrical, approximately 54 inches indiameter by 86 inches 
long. It is considered a "mission success" package. This package will contain several 
internal experiments with an optical switching mechanism that will enable each to use the 
available light in a sequential manner. 
Weight of the on-axis experiment is 800 pounds, exclusive of the container which adds 200 
pounds. The three experiments contained in it are (1) an echelle spectrograph, (2) a high 
resolution imaging (slitless) spectrograph, and (3) a low resolution, wider spectral range, 
imaging spectrograph. 
The on-axis experiment package is the most complex and expensive of the four, making use 
of the incoming light with a minimum of internal reflections. 
2.2.2.2 Radial Experiment Packages 
The radial experiment packages will be built by the various principal investigators. The 
box for each experiment will be supplied to the experimenter to fill with his apparatus. In 
this way there will be assurance of uniform fit and replaceability relative to the spacecraft 
structure. 
The radial experiments will be simple, compared to the on-axis experiments. Total weight 
of all three radial experiments is 900 lb. They occupy quarters of a 100 inch OD by 36 inch 
ID annulus, and taper in height from 42 inches in front to 32 inches in the rear. 
The three radial experiments are: 
" An imaging field camera, 
* A photometer/polarimeter, and 
* A Fourier IR interferometer combined with a conventional grating spectrograph. 
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2.2.2.3 Offset Tracker
 
The offset tracker utilizes a large diagonal flat mirror, stationary and outside the package,
 
to fold the guidance field through 900. The mirror has a central hole to pass the experiment
 
field on to the experiment packages.
 
Two fine error sensors will be provided in the offset tracker, one redundant, capable of rho, 
theta translation over the 16 inch diameter guidance field. These sensors will be of the 
image dissector type, and will be physically scanned over the equivalent of 1 minute of arc. 
Weight of the offset tracker is 300 1b' and the diagonal mirror, 200 lb. 
2.2.3 Spacecraft Mechanisms 
2.2.3.1 Primary Mirror Support Mechanism 
This mechanism is intended for precise structural support of the primary in its cell, in such 
a way as to preserve the optical figure of the mirror. It is described, together with the 
primary mirror, in Reference (1). 
2.2.3.2 Secondary Mirror Adjustment Mechanism 
This mechanism carries the secondary mirror cell, and is supported on the spider vanes at 
the far end of the secondary mirror support structure. The mechanism is capable of moving 
the secondary mirror over a limited range, in five degrees of freedom. It provides a means 
of compensation for misalignments of the secondary relative to the primary mirror, caused 
by structural distortion arising from launch stresses or thermal gradients. The mechanism 
will operate in a closed loop, with signals from a focus and image sensor carried in the on­
axis experiment package. Overriding manual control of the mechanism from the ground is 
also possible. 
2.2.3.3 Radial Experiment Selector 
This is a mission success mechanism located behind the offset tracker flat, into the central 
experiment optical path to divert the light to the radial experiments. The mirror is capable 
of rotation, in order to switch the light to a selected experiment. However, when on-axis 
experimentation is to be resumed, the mirror must be retracted from the central optical 
path. If the mechanism fails to do this the on-axis experiment is disabled. 
The mechanism is attached to the on-axis package, and therefore replaceable with the on­
axis experiment. 
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2.2.3.4 Structural Spacecraft Mechanisms 
These comprise the mechanisms for sun shade deployment, solar paddle deployment and 
rotation, and latching of the subsystems and experiment modules in place after placement 
in orbit. They are considered part of the spacecraft structure and are costed with it. 
The docking ring, attached to the spacecraft structure in the shuttle supported version, is a 
stationary unit. The active mechanism for docking is a part of the Shuttle Service Module. 
2.2.4 Optics 
The 120 inch primary mirror is a monolithic "light-weighted" (cored) structure of low ex­
pansion material. The secondary mirror is of similar construction. The offset tracker 
folding flat is solid and of low expansion material. 
The primary mirror is further described and discussed, particularly regarding support 
means, in pp. 38-45 of Reference (1). 
The primary optics are very long lead time items, especially the primary mirror. Thus to 
protect the program schedule, one more set of optics will be manufactured than the number 
of vehicles. In this way a failure of the prototype optics in manufacture or transport, for 
example, would be covered by the available back-up set. If not used for the prototype, the 
back-up would be available to cover a failure in the optics of a succeeding vehicle. 
2.2.5 Spacecraft Subsystems 
2.2.5.1 General
 
The baseline concept for the LST, calls for the nine replaceable modules described previously. 
The subsystem modules will be available as spares for replacement as complete units, via 
shuttle service flights, in the event of failure of a critical component or loss of a mission­
success function in a subsystem. The experiment modules will be replaced on a regular 
basis to provide updating and extension of the scientific mission. Each module will require 
a structural, mechanical, thermal, and electrical interface with the LST and the intent of 
the design is to keep these interfaces as simple and reliable as possible. Each module will 
be provided with test connectors for ground test and maintenance as a complete assembly. 
2.2.5.2 Stabilization and Control 
The detailed listing of S & C components is given in Table 2-3, together with explanatory 
remarks. Figure 2-8, a & b, shows a functional block diagram of the S & C subsystem. It 
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should be noted that the pneumatics (stored gas) section is located in a separate module as is 
the offset tracker, which is located in a radial bay module. In addition, three magnetic 
torquer bars and 16 gas jet nozzles are located elsewhere on the structure and are not re­
placeable. 
The expendable (Nitrogen) gas used for initial stabilization consists of 315# of N2 stored in 
three tanks. Under nominal operating conditions, this supply should last for three years or 
more as-extrapolated from present experience with OAO A-2. 
The mode sequence of the S & C subsystem progresses from initial spacecraft stabilization 
to experiment fine pointing utilizing the offset tracker. In the event of failure of a critical 
S & C component, alternate paths can provide a safe orbital hold and docking stabilization 
mode. 
2.2.5.3 Electrical Power 
The detailed listing of Electrical Power components is given in Table 2-3, together with 
explanatory remarks. The EPS will supply raw D. C. to the other subsystems and experiment 
modules where conversion and regulation will be performed by standardized sub-modules 
which are part of each integrated package. 
The LST/Shuttle interface will be capable of supplying electrical power during launch and 
insertion as well as resupply via an umbilical connection to the spacecraft wiring harness. 
Figure 2-9 is a schematic of the spacecraft harness configuration. 
2.2.5.4 Communications and Data Handling
 
A component listing is given in Table 2-3, together with explanatory remarks.
 
2.2.5.5 Pneumatics
 
A component listing is given in Table 2-3, together with explanatory remarks. The 16 gas
 
jets are external to the pneumatics module and are not replaceable (but are multiply redun­
dant). It is presently intended that low pressure regulated gas will be distributed to these
 
jets via pneumatics lines equipped with quick-disconnect couplings between the pneumatics
 
module and the spacecraft lines.
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Table 2-3. OAO/LST Subsystem Components, Development Status & Characteristics -. STATUS CATEGORIES 
1 - Available 
2 - Avail. with mode 
3 - State of the Art 
4 - Development 
Status 
Estimate No. Power 
Subsystem Component 7/21 Justification of Estimate Reqd WT. (lb) (watts) Size (inches) Remarks 
Comnuications and Diplexer 2 2 3 6x xS 
Data Handling Command RCVR 2 4 2 4x5x4 
Narrow Hand X)mitter 2 1 1.5 6xSx2 
Comm. Decoder 
Telem Format Contr. 
2 
2 
2 8 8 x 6 x 4 Used with fAUX for Inter-Subsystem Comm. 
Used with MUX for Inter-Subsystem Comm. 
On I/O's 2 3 i5 5xex6 
Board Core (BAM) 
Processor) Bulk Mem. 
2 
2 
is a "SEMS" 5-L System 16 
2 
6 
10 
5 x 7 x 4 
8x6x5 
Random Access Mem. (4Kwords each x 18 bits )Core 
1 x 106 Bits each - Serial Mere Storage 
(C. P.U. 2 3 13 Sxex6 
Comp. Oper. Moitor 2 1 2 6x6x3 
Narrow Bend Tape Rec. 
Wide Hand Tape rec. 
1 
4 
Similar to GAO-OG0 
New Dev. 
T-R 1 
2 
18 
18 
8 x 8 x 6 
8 x 8 x 6 
Wide Hand X'mitter 2 Prob. Existing Design 2 2.5 6 x 5 x2 "8" Band 
Comm. Deteotor/Verifier 
Power Amp. & RF Switch 
2 2 1.5 4 x 5 x 3.5 Also known as signal combiner, detector (2 req'd) 
Wiring Harness 
Multiplexer 2 2 10 6x6x3 
Power Converter 2 3 7 6x10x3 
Tape fec. Interface 2 1 6 SxGxS Like GPEI (on OAO) 
Stabilization and 
Control 
Fixed Head Tracker 
Dig. Son Sens. Elect. 
Inertial Ref. Unit 
Solar Aspect Sensor 
FWJC (Controller) 
I 
1I 
1 
i 
2 
Similar to OAO 2 
1 
2 
1 
3 
14 
10 
50 
10 
20 
10 12 x 8 x 7 
S x6 x 4 
9 x 9x9 
8 x 6 x4 
9 x 8 x 6.6 
Complete Optics & Electronics in Integrated Package 
Electronics only 
Gyro Package only 
Electronics only 
Magnetometer 
Wheels 
Inverter 
2 
3 
2 
2 
6 
1 
7 
60 
40 
10 x 6 x 4 
17 O.D. x 8 deep 
20 x 9.6 x 9 
Sensor only 
Includes S & C Power Conversion 
Digital Sun Sensor 
Remote Decoder 
Multiplexer 
1 
2 
2 
4 
2 
4 
2 
15 
10 
3 x 3 x 2 
10 x 6 x 4 
14 x 6 x 4 
Optics only 
Mag. Torquer Bars 3 3 112 6.0" OD. x 45.6" long GAO torquer Bar Type 
Wiring Harness 
mU Electronics 
Offset Tracker 
Magnetometer Elect 
4 
1 
2 
1 
2 
75 
40 
1 
18 x xo06 
1i0 6 x 4 
Located in Separate Radial Bay Module 
Solar Aspect Sens 1 4 2 Optics only 
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FOLDOUT FRAME Table 2-3. OAO/LST Subsystem Components Development Status & Characteristics (Cont.) STATUS CATEGORIES 
1 - Available 
2 - Avail. with mro s 
3 - State of the Art 
4 - Development 
Status 
Estimate No. Power 
Subsystem Component 7/21 Justification of Estimate Reqd WT. (ib) (watts) Size (inches) Remarks 
Pneumatics Gas Tanks 2 3 3154 N2 Total Gas Wt. 
Regulators 2 Like GAO 2 Hi-Pressure 
Solenoid Valves 
Valves (Shut-off) 
2 
2 
16 
3 
Condal Solenoid Valves - III thrust (located in S & C Module)
Latching I 
Piping 
Wiring Harness 
Gas Jets (Hi-thrust) 
Pneu. Connectors 
2 
1 
3 
16 
Fledble Tubing from PN-Module to Jets 
Not in Sub yst. Module - Mounted on S/C stract. 
Fill & Dump Syst. 
Electrical Power Batteries 1 Similar to OAO 6 20 A-H (22 cell Ni-Cad.) Anhydrode cell in each 
Battery Chg. Contr. 
Solar Array 
3 
1 
12 
-240 ft. 2 
PWlVI Reg.[ 
100l-cm cell, 57,535 N-P Silicon, 2 x 2 om. x 14 mil thick 
Multiplexer 2 10 
Diode Box 2 
Power Dist. Unit. 2 
Structure Thermal Shield 2 Modified Titan Tank 1 1100 Aluminaum. 
Sec. Mirror Support 4 1 2400 Titanium Trusswork 
Prim. Mirror Support 4 1 2300 Titanium 
Instrum. Support 4 1 1300 Titanium 
Subsyst. Support 3 1 2000 Spacecraft (Aluminum) & Transition Ring (Titanium) Ass 'y 
Docking Ring 
Solar Arrays 
Sushade 
3 
2 
2 
GAC-Evolved Design Concept
Like OAO 
1 
2 
1 
125 
300 
As per OAO Design 
Aluminum 
Subsyst. Mod. Struct. 3 4 250 Aluminum 
Radial Mod. Box Struct. 3 4 100 Titanium 
Primary Optics Primary Mirror 
Secondary Mirror 
4 
4 
GSFC Data 1 
1 
5000 
500 
Optically Polished Ceorvit (Owens-Illinois) 
Optically Polished Cervit 
Optical Align Assy's.
Offset Tracker Folding 
Flat 
1 250 Optically Polished Cervit. 
Spacecraft Mechanism Solar Array Drive 3 Bendix Data 2 50 Wt - Estimate 
Sunshade Development 3 2 
Docking Mech. 
S/S Latching Mech's 
4 
3 
i 
9 Part of RM able Module Struct. Assy's 
Prim Miror Support 4 33 
Sec. Mirror Adjust Mech. 4 GSFC Data 1 100 
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Table 2-3. OAO/LST Subsystem Components Development Status & Characteristics (Cont.) STATUS CATEGORIES 
I - Available
2 - Avail. with mods3 - State of the Art 
4 - Development 
Status 
Estimate No. Power 
Subsystem Component 7/21 Justification of Estimate Reqd WT. (t0) (watts) Size (inches) Remarks 
Thermal Heat Pipes 2 GAO - B Experiment 250 Approx. lbs., Distrib. About S/C 
Skins 2 GAO - B Experiment{ Silver-teflon Tape (GSFC Devel.) 
Louvers 2 Like GAO A-2, B, C 4 Located on Subsyst. Module Struet. 
Heaters 1 Dlstrib. about S/C 
Thermal Blankets 1 Like GAO 150 
Elect. & Wiring S/C Harness 3 1 
Struet. instrum. 1 
Fusistor & Pyo 2 
Struct. Heaters 1 
Antennas S, Bond 2 2 
V1HF 2 
Service Module Docing Mech 4 New Devel, I GSFC Layouts 
Servicing Mech. 4 2 
Module Storage Mech 4 2 
Sirongback Meeh. Strong Back 4 New Devel. I GSFC Layouts 
Erection Mech. 4 1 
LST/Shuttle Flight 
Support 
LST "Soft Mount" 
Cradle 
4 1 
Shuttle hard point 
Pickup Mech. 
3 
1 
LST/TITAN flight LST/Titan nterstage 3 1 10001 
support Bulbous Shroud 2 NASA Program 1 NASA Development "Viking" shroud Program 
Scientific Exper. On-Axis Exper. Module 
Radial Exper. 41 
4 
4 
GSFC Data 1 
1 
1000 I 
300 
54" OD x 86" Ing. 
Pie Shaped 
"Mission Success" Exper. - 2 yr. Replacement 
Low Cost Exper. - 1 yr. Replacement GAG to Cost Module Struct. 
Radial Exper. #2 4 1 300 Pie Shaped Low Cost Exper. - I yr. Replacement GAG to Cost Module Struct. 
Radial Exper. #3 4 1 800 Pie Shaped Low Cost Exper. - I yr. Replacement GAC to Cost Module Struct. 
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2.3 MANUFACTURING 
The major manufacturing effort is directed towards fabrication of six (6) flight LST 
structares to be launched by conventional means. The first LST structure will be utilized 
as a structural test article (STA) and later refurbished to a flight article. Additionally, a 
wood/metal mockup of the spacecraft section will be utilized for development of electrical 
and fluids lines runs, and a systems test stand (STS) to test and checkout spacecraft 
sub-systems and experiment modules. 
2.3.1 Manufacturing Schedule 
A tentative LST Manufacturing Schedule is shown in Fig. 2-10. The schedule summarizes 
the manufacturing activities necessary to meet program milestones. 
The fabrication of the STA and the flight articles is spread over seven years to minimize 
yearly manpower and tooling requirements while maintaining shop efficiency. The first 
fabrication bar for flight articles 2 through 5 represents the effort necessary to complete 
the structure. The structures will then be placed in storage until 19 months prior to launch. 
Three of these months will be utilized to update the struoture and install and checkout the 
electrical and pneumatic lines. The remainder of the time is for installation of equipment, 
test and checkout. 
The Contractors philosophy in manufacturing of the LST will utilize streamlined prototype 
shop operations in a centralized facility. This will be based heavily on previous OAO 
experience. A nucleus of versatile, highly skilled and flexible shop personnel will be 
utilized, and a minimum of formal tooling is anticipated. The centralized facility will 
reduce lines of communication, reduce paperwork and make possible simplified drawings 
and methods sheets. Handling time and costs will also be reduced by the central location, 
and generalized tool shop equipment will be emphasized for fast turnaround. In general, 
such an approach to manufacturing is ideally suited to low quantity, highly engineered 
hardware programs such as the LST. 
2.3.2 Flight Vehicle 
The LST flight articles consist of five major subassemblies (Figs. 2-2, and 2-3). These 
are the spacecraft and transition ring, the radial and on-axis instrument structure, the 
primary mirror support, the secondary mirror support and the thermal shield. In addition, 
there are four subsystem modules, four radial experiment modules, an on-axis experiment 
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module, a light shield, interstage and two solar arrays. A high percentag6 (approximately 
80%) of the structure is fabricated from welded titanium. The module structures will be 
fabricated in-house. These structures will then be shipped to the subsystem manufacturers 
and experimenters for equipment integration and testing prior to return for spacecraft 
installation. Six flight vehicles will be manufactured. The first is considered a prototype 
but the structure will be identical to the subsequent articles. The STA will be refurbished 
into the sixth flight vehicle. 
2.3.2.1 Flight Vehicle Buildup 
Flight vehicle buildup consists of the manufacture and assembly of the structure, installation 
of electrical and pneumatic lines, mirrors and equipment modules and alignment and testing 
of spacecraft systems. 
2.3.2.2 Major Subassemblies 
Most of the major subassemblies will be fabricated from titanium sheet, tubing, plate and 
machined parts using the manual TIG welding joining methods. The process produces good 
weld joints in the gages required by the design and the resulting assembly has better thermal 
properties than a mechanically fastened structure. Combination assembly and weld fixtures 
will be utilized to limit tooling cost. 
The secondary mirror support structure fabrication procedure is an example of the cost 
savings manufacturing planning that was done for vehicle buildup. This support assembly 
consists of a six bay circular titanium truss structure, 129 inches in diameter and 30 feet 
long. (Figure 2-4). The circumferential rings will be fabricated by forming tubular arc 
segments and butt welding them together. Rather than build a large assembly weld fixture 
to hold all six bays, a tool will be designed to weld the trusses one bay at a time. As each 
bay is welded, it will be indexed so the next bay can be welded to it. The required accuracies 
will be maintained by the indexing procedure. 
2.3.2.3 Final Assembly
 
The spacecraft transition and telescope sections will be assembled concurrently. The final
 
assembly phase will include joining of the two major assemblies, spacecraft and telescope,
 
the installation of lines and prefit of the solar arrays and interstage to the spacecraft.
 
Assembly of the spacecraft is completed by joining the spacecraft subsystem support with 
the transition ring. 
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Assembly of the telescope requires the joining of the primary and secondary mirror 
support structures, the radial and on-axis instrument support structure and the thermal 
shield. Prefit to the transition ring and initial alignment will be accomplished at this time. 
During the assembly of the telescope, critical equipment and instrument interfaces will be 
established on the supporting structures. This will be accomplished with the use of 
optically aligned installation fixtures. A network of optical lines of sight will be integrated 
in the assembly fixture, controlling the orientation of all critical equipment interfaces. 
After structural assembly of the spacecraft and telescope, pneumatic and electrical lines 
will be installed. Linkages and mechanisms will be assembled and initially adjusted. 
The telescope assembly will be disassembled and the primary mirror support structure will 
be shipped to the mirror fabricator for installation. Upon receipt of the mirror and support 
structure, the telescope structure will be reassembled, and the secondary mirror and 
adjustor mechanism installed. The telescope will be joined to the spacecraft structure, 
completing final assembly. 
Tooling required for the spacecraft and telescope subassemblies includes structural and 
alignment assembly fixtures, equipment and instrument interface installation tools. Optical 
alignment equipment will be permanently installed in the telescope assembly and alignment 
fixture. 
2.3.2.4 Subsystems Installation and Factory Checkout 
Subsequent to structure assembly and lines installation and checkout, the vehicle will be 
cleaned before subsystems are installed. 
Installation and checkout of subsystems modules will be accomplished in serial time to 
isolate the testing of the systems. When all four system modules have been installed and 
are functioning properly, the offset tracker and the experiment modules will be installed 
and their operation verified. Finally, the entire vehicle will be functionally integrated and 
operated. Following this test, it will be weighed and its center of gravity determined prior 
to packing and shipment to GSFC. 
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2.3.2.5 Mockup 
A wood and sheet metal mockup of the spacecraft section will be fabricated for use in 
development of the electrical and pneumatic lines runs and harness configurations between 
subsystem modules and experiment modules and thrusters, etc.. Methods engineers will 
support design engineering in determining the optimum lines routing. 
2.3.2.6 Structural Test Article 
The structural test article (STA) structure will be identical to the flight vehicle structures. 
It will not contain equipment or electrical/pneumatic lines. Mass representations will be 
installed to simulate the equipment modules and mirrors. Thermal insulation blankets will 
not be installed. Heat pipes will be functional. Strain gages and accelometers will be 
installed, test fixtures assembled and set up and test support provided. 
Subsequent to static and dynamic testing, the exterior (thermal blankets, etc.) and solar 
arrays will be simulated and the article will be used for facilities verification and launch 
vehicle match/mate tests. The structure will then be refurbished for use as a flight vehicle. 
2.3.2.7 System Test Stand (STS) 
This test stand will provide a means to integrate, test and qualify the subsystems and 
experiment modules. The structure will be fabricated to locate the various modules in 
their relative spacecraft positions. Flight configured wire harness and pneumatic lines will 
be used for interconnections. Provisions will be made for test taps and stimuli. 
2.3.2.8 Ground Support Equipment 
Ground support equipment will be manufactured to support development test and flight 
article manufacture, acceptance test, transportation, launch and orbital operations. This 
equipment will either be of new design or modified from the OAO program. 
2.3.2.9 Off-Site Manufacturing Support 
Testing at GSFC and pre-launch operations will be supported by manufacturing test 
technicians as required. 
2.3.3 Shuttle Launch 
The major manufacturing effort for a Shuttle launch-revisit program is directed towards 
fabrication of three (3) flight structures. The first structure will be utilized as a structural 
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test article (STA) and later refurbished to a flight article. A wood/metal mockup of the 
spacecraft section will be utilized for development of electrical and fluids lines runs, and a 
systems test stand (STS) to test and checkout spacecraft subsystems and experiment modules. 
2.3.3.1 Schedule 
The LST Manufacturing Schedule-Shuttle Launch-Revisit is shown in Figure 2-11. The 
manufacturing activities necessary to meet program milestones are summarized thereon. 
The fabrication of the STA and the two flight structures is scheduled to minimize yearly 
manpower and tooling requirements while maintaining shop efficiency. The second flight 
structure and refurbishment of the STA will be completed up to the point of lines installa­
tion and then placed in storage. Eighteen months prior to launch, the structures will be 
removed from storage, up-dated and the lines installed in preparation for final equipment 
installation, test and checkout. 
2.3.3.2 Flight Vehicle 
The LST flight article structure for the Shuttle program is identical to that required for 
conventional launch with the addition of a soft docking mechanism, automated equipment 
module latches and quick-disconnects, and Shuttle cargo bay interface support points. 
Three flight (3) vehicles and one spare set of replaceable subsystem modules will be 
fabricated. 
2.3.3.3 Flight Vehicle Buildup 
The flight vehicle buildup for Shuttle launch and resupply missions is identical to the 
sequence for the conventional program. Because of the resupply capability of the Shuttle, 
however, additions must be made to the spacecraft to accommodate the launch/supply 
mechanism. 
A soft docking mechanism must be added to the lower end of the spacecraft and transition 
ring structure, and Shuttle cargo bay support interface fittings to the transition ring. 
Remote controlled latches and quick disconnects must be added to the subsystem and 
experiment module interfaces. To insure 100% interchangeability, master tool gages and 
inspection checking tools must be provided to coordinate the assembly fixtures. 
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2.3.3.4 Interstege Adapter 
One interstage adapter will be required for the first launch since this is to be a conventional 
launch. Subsequent launches will be via Shuttle. 
Final assembly, critical alignments, electrical and pneumatic lines and equipment installa­
tions, factory checkout; and off-site manufacturing support are similar to those operations 
described in Sections 2.3.2.3, 2.3.2;4, and 2.3.2.9 for the Titan baseline LST vehicles. 
2.3.3.5 Ground Support Equipment 
Ground Support Equipment will include both modified GAO equipment and new design. It 
will be similar to that required with the Shuttle. 
2.3.3.6 Launch-Resupply Mechanism 
A special LST cradle/supply module must be fabricated for installation into the Shuttle for 
each mission. A strong back will be used to cradle the LST in the Shuttle cargo hold during 
launch and retrieval. It will be capable of changing the nine replaceable modules on the 
spacecraft.
 
Both the strong back and the service module will be fabricated from aluminum sheet metal, 
extrusions and machined fittings. Deployment cylinders, elevator and the docking mecha­
nisms and snubbers will be installed. Tools will be required to maintain the interchangeable 
mechanical and electrical interfaces. 
2.3.4 Manufacturing Cost Estimate 
The manufacturing estimate shows comparative costs for a six (6) flight vehicle program to 
the Titan baseline concept and a three (3) flight vehicle program to the Shuttle baseline 
concept. The first vehicle in either program is to be a structural test article, refurbished 
later to flight status. 
2.3.4.1 Concept 
The Titan/LST concept is based on the launch of six LSTTs by an existing launch vehicle, 
namely Titan lIl?. 
The Shudtle/LST concept is based on the launch resupply/retrieval of two (2) LST's by a new 
launch vehicle namely Shuttle, and one (1) launched by Titan (because Shuttle unavailable) 
with the same resupply/retrieve features as the two (2) Shuttle launched vehicles. 
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Six (6) Titan interstages are required for the Titan/LST launch program. One (1) Titan 
interstage is required for the first launch (by Titan) of the Shuttle/LST program. 
Modification of the Shuttle to accept the LST has not been included in this estimate but is 
included in the total program as shuttle modification costs. 
One (1) additional set of subsystem/experiment modules, has been included in the SHUTTLE/ 
LST estimate. Additional sets were not included for Titan/LST. 
Spares of a more general nature have not been included in either program cost because of 
storage problems arising from a lengthy program and the possibility of cannibalizing later 
vehicles until program experience indicates a trend and need for spares items. 
Basic differences between Titan/LST and Shuttle LST concept occur in the launch vehicle 
mounting areas and between the fixed subsystem and experiment modules for Titan LST 
versus the replaceable subsystem and experiment modules for Shuttle LST. The following 
shows the differences: 
Titan LST Shuttle LST 
Telescope Same Same 
Spacecraft Same Mechanical and electrical 
modifications for module 
replaceability 
Transition Same Same 
Ring 
Interstage Titan Interstage Shuttle Strongback* Provisions 
Sub-System Not repairable or Repairable, retrievable in orbit 
Modules retrievable in orbit 
Experiment Not repairable or Repairable, retrievable in orbit 
Module retrievable in orbit 
2.3.4.2 Conditions and/or Assumptions 
The following conditions and/or assumptions are applicable to the manufacturing estimate 
and are in accord with the ground rules established by Program/Engineering for this study. 
*Allowance for one (1) Titan launch interstage was included in Shuttle/LST estimate because 
of late Shuttle launch availability. 
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The same conditions/assumptions are applied to either Titan LST or Shuttle LST concept 
except the quantities will read (6) for Titan and (3) for Shuttle. 
* 	 Preliminary design will be completed by GSFC. 
* 	 The prime contractor will produce detail drawings from the GSFC design. 
" 	 The prime contractor will perform development testing and manufacture six (6) 
flight articles (Titan LST) or three (3) Shuttle LST. 
* 	 Sub-system/component detail design will be performed by the sub-contractor. 
* 	 Development testing and qualification of the sub-systems/components will be 
performed by the sub-contractor. 
* Experiment modules will be supplied GFE.
 
" The contractor will integrate spacecraft sub-systems/components to the system,
 
but the sub-contractor will be responsible for replacement/repair of defective 
sub-systems (black boxes). 
* 	 Environmental testing will be done at GSFC. 
* 	 Vehicles will be manufactured to either the same Titan or Shuttle point design. 
* 	 Major design changes and vehicle updating allowances have not been included in the 
estimate. 
* 	 The manufacturing estimate does not include support of the vehicle at GSFC or KSC. 
2.3.5 Estimating Rationale Titan LST and Shuttle LST 
2.3.5.1 Structure 
The Manufacturing Planning Estimate was prepared after analysis of OAO and LM structural 
cost histories and application of the experience derived from the structural build up and test 
programs for these successful spacecraft. Appropriate materials and fabrication complexity 
factors for titanium construction were based upon recent experience with titanium airframe 
structure for the Navy's F-14 and projected manufacturing capability resulting from this 
ongoing program. 
2.3.5.2 Systems Fabrication and Installation 
Manufacturing and installation of: 
* 	 Wire harnesses 
* 	 Fluid Lines 
* 	 Pneumatic Lines 
o 	 Equipment 
etc. were directly related to OAO experience as was test and checkout of the vehicle. A 
95% learning curve was used for vehicle recurring cost. The flat curve was considered 
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applicable because of the lengthy program, low production rate and the long storage periods 
between structural assembly and final assembly for vehicles #2 through #6. 
2.3.5.3 RC 23 
The estimate was prepared in conjunction with the Support Engineering Department and was 
based on OAO experience and Support Department knowledge of currently available support 
equipment. 
2.3.5.4 RC 40/74 
The estimate was based on a review of the LST design tooling hours required for the space­
craft and were directly based on OAO experience with additional hours being estimated for 
the telescope sections. Hours for RC 40 Methods have been included in the estimate. 
Sustaining tooling was estimated as 1%per month of non-recurring tooling hours expended 
for the continuous manufacturing period and as a level of effort for stretched out storage/ 
final assembly period. 
2.3.5.5 RC 52 
The estimate was based on the relationship of RC 52 hours to RC 20/23. A 15% relationship 
was used for the program with higher manloading during the continuous manufacturing period 
and a level of effort during the stretched out storage/final assembly period. The percentage 
was derived from LM/OAO experience. 
2.3.6 Product Manufacturing Cost Summary Total Hours 
The following tables summarize the manufacturing estimate for (6) Titan baseline concept 
LST and (3) Shuttle baseline LST. Total manufacturing delta hours are also shown. 
MANUFACTURING HOURS IN THOUSANDS 
Qty. 
Titan Baseline 
N.R. Recur. Qty. 
Shuttle Base 
N.R. Recur. 
Delta 
N.R. Recur. 
LST 
Interstage 
Sets Modules 
6 
6 
1,535 
58 
4,413 
304 
3 
1 
1 
1,697 
58 
-0-
2,511 
66 
73 
+162 -1,902 
-0- - 238 
-0- + 73 
1,593 4,717 1,755 2,650 +162 -2, 067 
Totals 6,310 4,405 -1, 905 
Total Shuttle concept manufacturing saving 2, 067 - 162 = 1,905 hours. 
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MATERIAL
 
$ in Thousands
 
Production 
Titan Shuttle 
Non Ree. Rec. Non Rec. Rec. Non Rec. Rec. 
Vehicle 816.0 5539.0 912.0 3165.0 +96.0 -2374.0 
Interstage 50.0 277.0 50.0 50.0 -0- - 227.0 
Modules -0- -0- -0- 87.0 -0- + 87.0 
866.0 5816.0 962.0 3302.0 +96 -2514.0 
Totals 6682.0 4264 -2418.0 
SHUTTLE SAVINGS 2514 - 96 = 2418.,0 
Tooling 
Vehicle 583.0 506.0 648.0 287.0 +65.0 - 219.0 
Interstage 30.0 22.0 30.0 12.0 -0- - 10.0 
Modules -0- -0- -0- -0- -0- -0­
613 528.0 678.0 299.0 +65.0 - 229.0 
Totals 1141.0 977.0 - 164.0 
SHUTTLE SAVINGS 229.0 - 65.0 = -164.0 
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The following tables show the manufacturing estimate by non-recurring/recurring and by 
Resource Code for (6) Titan LST baseline concept and (3) Shuttle LST baseline concept. 
RC 20 

RC 40 

RC 74 

RC 23 

RC 52 

TOTALS 

TOTALS NON REC. & REC. 

RC 20 

RC 40 

RC 74 

RC 23 

RC 52 

TOTALS 

TOTALS NON REC. & REC. 

RC 20 

RC 52 

TOTALS 

TOTALS NON REC. & REC. 

TOTALS 
(6) LST 
Titan Baseline 
Non Recurring Recurring 
730,000 3,329,000 
280,000 170,000 
300,000 300,000 
100,000 100,000 
125,000 514,000 
1,535,000 4,413,000 
5,948,000 
(6) 
Titan Interstage 
20,000 240,000 
12, 000 6,000 
18,000 18,000 
4,000 4,000 
4,000 36,000 
58,000 304, 000 
362,000 
6,310,000 
(3) LST
 
Shuttle Baseline
 
Non Recurring Recurring 
799,000 1,901,000 
308,000 90,000 
330, 000 150,000 
120,000 70,000 
140,000 300,000 
1, 697,000 2,511,000 
4,208,000 
(1) 
Titan Interstage 
20,000 A3, 000 
12, 000 3,000 
18,000 9,000 
4,000 4,000 
4,000 7,000 
58,000 66,000 
124, 000 
(1) Set Modules 
-0- 63,000 
-0- 10,000 
-0- 73,000 
73,000 
4,405,000 
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The following table shows the manufacturing estimate for (6) Titan LST baseline concept 
and (3) Shuttle LST baseline concept. 
RC 20 Manufacturing 
Recurring 
Major Structure 
Sub-Systems Fabrication & Assembly 
Final Assembly, Checkout & Test 
Total RC 20 Recurring 
Non-Recurring Hours
 
Mock-up 

STS 

Development 

Refurbish STA 

Total Non-Recurring Hours 
Total RC 20 Recurring & Non-Recurring 
RC 40/74 Tooling 
Non-Recurring 
Methods 
Design 

Build 

Sub-Total Non-Recurring 

Recurring 
Total Tooling Recurring & Non-Recurring 
(6) LST (3) LST 
Titan Baseline Shuttle Baseline 
2,100, 000 1,100, 000 
648,000 445, 000 
581, 000 356,000 
3,329,000 1,901,000 
40,000 50,000 
40,000 50,000 
200,000 220,000 
450,000 479, 000 
730,000 799,000 
4,059,000 2, 700,000 
80,000 88,000 
200, 000 220,000 
300,000 330,000 
580,000 638,000 
470,000 240,000 
1,050,000 878,000 
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(6) LST (3) LST 
Titan Baseline Shuttle Baseline 
RC 23 Support 
Non-Recurring 100,000 120,000 
Recurring 100,000 70,000 
Total RC 23 Recurring & Non-Recurring 200,000 190,000 
RC 52 
Non-Recurring 125,000 140,000 
Recurring 514,000 300,000 
Total RC 52 639,000 440,000 
TOTAL MANUFACTURING 5,948,000 4,208,000 
Non-Recurring 1,535, 000 1, 697,000 
Recurring 4,413,000 2,511,000 
TOTALS 5,948,000 4, 208,000 
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MANUFACTURING HOURS #1 SPACECRAFT
 
This estimate is vehicle only and does not include interstage or spare/resupply module 
costs. 
Primary Mirror Support 
Secondary Mirror Support 
Thermal Shield 
Radial and On Axis Inst. Structure 
Spacecraft 
Transition 
Sub-Total: 
Cooling Pipes 
Sunshade 

Solar Paddles 
Thermal Blankets 
Experiment Boxes 
S/S Structure 
Docking Ring 
Pneumatics 
Mechanical Details 
Spacecraft Wiring 
Final Assembly, Checkout and Test 
Total #1: 
LST LST 
Titan Baseline Shuttle Baseline 
87,000 87,000 
93,000 93,000 
41,000 41, 000 
59,000 59,000 
49,000 49,000 
49,000 49,000 
378,000 378,000 
4,000 4,000 
17,000 17,000
 
15,000 15,000 
6,000 6,000 
17,000 29,000 
24,000 41,000 
-0- 9,000 
5,000 5,000 
16,000 16,000 
13,000 13,000 
105,000 110, 000 
600,000 643,000 
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LST 	 LST 
Titan Baseline Shuttle Baseline 
Refurbish Station to F. A. 
Refurbish 	 . Systems 222,000 251,000 
. Structure 228,000 228,000 
Total Refurbish: 450,000 479,000 
Mock-up 40,000 50,000 
SITS 40,000 50,000 
Development 200,000 200,000 
Final Assembly, Checkout and Test 
Final Assembly 20,000
 
Component Test 55,000
 
Vehicle Test 30,000
 
Total 	 105,000 hours 
2.3.7 Quality Assurance 
The latest NASA Quality Document NHB 5300.4 has served as a guideline for a Quality 
Assurance Plan. The plan follows the intent of the NASA document which is to identify the 
prime quality program "cost drivers", and minimize them without incurring additional 
risks, and without sacrificing established high quality standards. Candidate areas have 
been identified and included in this study. However, GAC and NASA approval for future 
implementation of the assumptions listed below will be required. 
2.3.7.1 Inspection 
* 	 Drawings 
General line drawings listing EMC (Electromagnetic Compatibility) groupings and 
approximate lengths are acceptable in lieu of formal lines drawings. 
* 	 Government Inspection Agency NASA/NAVPRO effort for the entire OAO/LST 
Program is on a customer post audit basis. The NAVPLANTREP Team 
Verification System permits the GAC Quality/Inspection personnel to move ahead 
in the manufacturing/test cycle with monitoring and/or surveillance by the GIA. 
During the "Spotcheck" function by Government Inspectors, any items requiring 
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corrective action or follow-up are accomplished by approved procedures. All 
current DOD (Aircraft) Programs for Government acceptance are conducted in this 
manner. In addition, the delegation of contractor personnel to perform inspection 
for the GoVernment Inspection Agency is assumed. 
* 	 Non-Conformance Procedure 
The large aircraft MDR (Minor Discrepancy Repair) Manual is adapted to satisfy 
all areas of fabrication. A section on Electrical Connectors will be added to the 
manual. MDR type repairs for simple items are permitted without the service of 
Liaison Engineering. The documentation and sign-off shall be accomplished by 
inspection on the vehicle discrepancy sheet. 
Critical items shall require full processing of the MDR Procedure. 
2.3.7.2 	 Project Quality Engineering at Sellers Facilities 
* 	 Quality Engineering participation at Design Reviews is considered mandatory. New 
technological elements that may require specialized equipment and/or personnel 
training will then be known early in the program, thus avoiding costly crash "catch 
up" programs. 
An additional Program Cost Reduction is realized by developing a well defined 
Parts/Components/Assemblies Manufacturing Flow Chart for each Flight Unit or 
Module during early program planning at Seller's. Quality/Inspection points with 
inspection criteria documents clearly indicated will be provided. The final 
sequence chart will be available for contractor approval by CDR (Critical Design 
Review). 
This approach will insure a more efficient control of Sellers by a GAC Itinerant/ 
Surveillance type and reduce the need for a resident Quality Control representative. 
A large percentage of equipment/Seller problems that become "panics" will be 
prevented by this method. 
" 	 A well defined Seller Requirement Document with adequate Quality Control input is 
utilized to minimize delays, additional travel, document disapproval, etc. generally 
caused by inadequate definition of, and misinterpretation of requirements. 
* 	 A statistical approach, such as the Bayesian Reliability Evaluation (Ref. 2), will be 
developed and applied to selected Sellers on testing subsystem equipment 
components. 
The Bayesian Reliability Evaluation is a "modern" statistical approach to reduce 
testing on the Component/Assembly/Subsystem level. The philosophy and proce­
dures form the basis for the development of a rational and consistent structure for 
the design of experiments and for decision making in the face of uncertainty. The 
Bayesian approach is of particular utility in small sample situations, by utilizing 
past historical data such as that obtained during OAO test and flight experience. 
" 	 Develop a select Seller Source List for Space Projects. Historical data from 
Apollo/LM and OAO Programs will be utilized to certify selected suppliers based 
on proven capabilities, in order to reduce or eliminate GAC Receiving Inspection/ 
In-House Testing. 
(Ref. 2) 	 "Bayesian Statistics for the Reliability Engineer", Proc. IEEE Annual Symp. on 
Reliability, Jan. 1966. 
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" 	 Develop OAO/LST Quality Workmanship Standards for equipment fabricated by or 
for Grumman. 
* 	 Review present OAO Flight Equipment Qualify Control requirements imposed on 
Seller by GAC, and impose Quality Standard QES-0002 where possible in lieu of 
QES-0001 (Islajor) for the OAO/LST Program. 
2.3.7.3 Quality Level Considerations 
Table 2-4 depicts cost category comparisons by Quality System Levels and hardware 
criticality of typical Flight Equipment procured from various subcontractors. The matrix 
includes a man-rated vehicle, OAO Spacecraft and F-14 Aircraft Component/Assemblies 
and all comparisons are of a current build. 
The equipment criticality column represents numbers assigned by Project Reliability for 
the OAO/LST Vehicle. Section 4.2.4, Availability Apportionment, describes the generation 
of these criticality ratings which represent a weighting of relative importance, on a scale 
of 10, for both subsystems and subsystem components. The Quality Control System Levels 
are assigned by Quality Control Program Management on the basis of equipment complexity 
and criticality within the vehicle or aircraft subsystems. 
Comparisons of Quality System Levels for identical or similar types of equipment are 
identified by an "X" in the appropriate column. As an example, the Sub-System Modules (4 
for the Titan ill OAO/LST Vehicle would require the major Quality System Level of GAC 
Spec. QES-0001 to ensure mission reliability. 
The Shuttle OAO/LST Vehicle as a result of Shuttle resupply shall permit application of 
"Off-The-Shell" aircraft type equipment in lieu of bi-rel space hardware throughout the 
subsystems and therefore shall permit reducing the Quality cost per uit procured. NASA/ 
GSFC concurrence for utilization of equipment in this category shall be required. 
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Tpble 2-4. OAO/LST - Shuttle Economic Study Quality Control Flight Equipment - Subcontractor Items - Quality Comparison 
EQUIPMENT CATEGORIES 
I - Available 
SUB-SYSTEM 
2 - Avail. Req. Modific. 
3 - State f the Art 
4 - Devel$pment Type 
TITAN III 
OAO/LST 
SPACECRAFT 
TYPICAL 
OAO 
SPACECRAFT 
TYPICAL 
LM 
SPACECRAFT 
F-14 
AIRCRAFT 
COMPONENTS 
SHUTTLE 
OAO/LST 
SPACECRAFT 
REMARKS 
MODULEiPi 
Communication & Data 
Handling 
Status INo. 
Req'd. 
Equipment 
Criticality 
S/S 
Quality Level 
Major/Mior 
QES QES 
0001 0002 
Quality Level 
Major/Minor 
QES- QES 
0001 0002 
Quality Level 
Major/Minor 
QCP QCP 
2.11 2.12 
Quality level 
Major/Minor 
QES QES 
0001 0002/1 
Qualiy Level 
Major/Minor 
QES QES 
0001 0002/1 
Diplexer (OAO) 
Command Receiver (OAO) 
Narrow Band Transmitter (OAO) 
Command Decoder 
Telemetry Format Control 
On- I10 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
4 
1 
2 
3 
7 
10 
5 
10 
6 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
Shuttle-based program 
with 12 to 18 month 
MTTF requirements 
can relax quality level 
specs on replaceable 
components. 
Board- Core 2 116 8 X X 
Processor (OAO) Bulk Mem. 
CPU 
Comp. Oper. Monitor 
Narrow Band Tape Rec. 
Wide Band Tape Hec. 
Wide Band Transmitter (S-B) 
Comm. Detector/verifier 
Power Amp. & RE Switch 
Wiring Harness 
Multiplexer 
Power Converter (Digital) 
2 
2 
2 
1 
4 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
3 
1 
1 
2 
2 
2 
2 
3 
7 
5 
7 
7 
9 
7 
9 
9 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
K-. > 
Tape Rec. Interface 2 1 7 
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Table 2-4. OAO/LST - Shuttle Economic Study Quality Control Flight Equipment - Subcontractor Items - Quality Comparison (Cot.) 
EQUIPMENT CATEGORIES 
1 - Available 
2 - Avail. Req. Modific. TITAN III TYPICAL TYPICAL F-14 SHUTTLE 
SUB-SYSTEM 3 - State of the Art 
4 - Development Type 
OAO/LST 
SPACECRAFT 
OAO 
SPACECRAFT 
LM 
SPACECRAFT 
AIRCRAFT 
COMPONENTS 
QAO/LST 
SPACECRAFT 
REMARKS 
MODULE #2 
Electrical Power 
Status No. 
Reqt d 
Equipment 
Criticality 
S/Sic 
Quality Level 
Major/Minor 
QES QES 
0001 0002 
Quality Level 
Major/Minor 
QES- QES-
0001 0002 
Quality Level 
Major/Minor 
QCP QCP 
2.11 2.12 
Quality Level 
Major/Minor 
QES QES 
0001 0002/1 
Qu ity Level 
Major/Minor 
QES QES 
0001 0002/1 
Batteries (OAO) 
Battery Charge Control 
Solar Array 
Multiplexer 
Diode Box (OAO) 
Power Distribution Unit 
1 
3 
1 
2 
2 
2 
6 
12 
8 
9 
7 
7 
9 
10 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
MODULE i3r 
Stabilization & Control 
Fixed Head Tracker 1 2 8 
Digital Sun Sensor Elec. 
Inertial Reference Unit 
Solar Aspect Sensor 
IFWJC (Controller) 
Magnetometer (OAO) 
Fine Wheels 
1 
1 
1 
2 
2 
3 
1 
2 
1 
3 
2 
6 
X 
X 
X 
XI 
X 
X 
> 
Inverter 
Digital Sun Sensor 
Remote Decoder 
Multiplexer 
Magnetometer Torquer Bars 
Wiring Harness 
IRU Electronics 
2 
1 
2 
2 
3 
1 
4 
2 
4 
3 
1 
2 
9 
6 
10 
10 
8 
X 
X 
X 
X 
Offset Tracker 
Magnetometer Elect. (OAO) 
Solar Aspect Sensor (OAO) 
4 
1 
1 
2 
4 X 
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Table 2-4. OAO/LST - Shuttle Economic Study Quality Cont-l Flight Equipment - Subcontractor Items - Quality Comparison (Cont.) 
EQUIPWENT CATEGORIES 
1 - Available 
SUB-SYSTEM 
2 ­
3 ­
4 -
Avail. Req. Modie. 
State of the Art 
Development Type 
TITAN I 
OAO/LST 
SPACECRAFT 
TYPICAL i 
OAO I 
SPACECRAFT 
TYPICAL 
LM 
SPACECRAFT 
F-14 
AIRCRAFT 
COMPONENTS 
SHITUTTLE 
OAO/LST 
SPACECRAFT 
REMARIKS 
MODULE #4 
Pneumnatics 
Status No. 
Req'd. 
Equipment 
Criticality
s/S i0 
Quality Level 
Major/MinorQES QES
0001 0002 
Qality Level 
Major/Minor
QES-
02 
Quality Level 
Major/minorQCP QCP 
2.11 2.12 
Quality Level 
Major/Minor
QES QES
0001 0002/1 
Quality Level 
Major/Minor 
QES QES
0001 0002/1 
Gas Supply Tanks (OAO) 
Regulators (OAO) 
Solenoid Valves (OAO) 
Valves (Shut-Off) (OAO) 
Piping 
Wiring Harness 
Gas Jets (High Thrust) 
Pneumatic Connectors 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
3 
3 
3 
2 
16 
3 
8 
9 
10 
10 
8 
8 
9 
9 
NX 
X 
x 
Xx 
XN 
X 
x 
X 
x 
X 
x 
Fill and Dump Systea 8 N x 
PRIMARY OPTICS 
Primary Mirror 
Secondary Mirror 
Optical Alignment Assem. 
Offset Tracker Fold. Flat 
4 
4 
4 
4 
1 
1 
1 
Ii 
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2.4 SPACECRAFT SUPPORT-GROUND OPERATIONS
 
Spacecraft Support-Ground Operations comprises ground support equipment (GSE), logistics,
 
trainers, training, publications, testing and facilities. Efforts in support of these elements
 
include:
 
* 	 Logistic Organization and Flow 
* 	 Maintainability Analysis 
* 	 Site Activation 
* 	 Technical Support Data 
* 	 Support of Manufacturing 
* 	 Subsystem Development and Integration Support 
* 	 Data Evaluation 
* 	 Experiment Support 
* 	 Services for Supply of Expendables 
* 	 Support for Computerization of Functional Test Plans and Procedures. 
A task description summary of the major elements follows. 
2.4.1 Ground Station 
The OAO/LST program will modify and make use of the present OAO Ground Station. This 
Ground Station contains a 930 Computer which performs the following tasks: 
" 	 Updates a status board and test conductor consoles with current spacecraft status 
data. 
* 	 Receives and processes status data from remote sites. 
* 	 Prepares and transmits contact messages to remote sites. 
* 	 Supplies the support computer program system (SCPS) with selected altitude data. 
The GSFC OAO Ground Station consists of three 930 XDS computers. One of these, Com­
puter B acts as a backup to either the A or C computers. 
The 930 XDS computer is a medium size general purpose computer (24 bit 32 K memory) 
with priority interrupt system and has a time sharing or cycle stealing process to handle 
various peripherals. A 2 million (6 bits) byte disc capability is provided in order to have 
rapid access to various resident programs and routines. These three computers actually 
make up two separate ground stations and are designed to support twoorbiting satellites at 
the same time. 
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Each OAO ground station is used for real-time monitoring of the spacecraft status data. It 
presents this data on a large display board (approximately 8 ft. x 18 ft.) for group monitor­
ing of the current status data. Individual subsystem monitoring is provided on various test 
conductor consoles. Quick responses to any spacecraft anomalies can be generated by use 
of thegroundcontroller's console allowing command changes during a real time contact of 
approximately 10 minutes. 
The "status display board concept" is applicable to any large satellite that has a large amount 
of status information to evaluate and the need to initiate ground actions to circumvent 
immediateproblems. During the early phases of the LST flight, this type of operation is 
pertinent. When initial problems are corrected and the on board computer self test pro­
grams and control programs are verified under actual flight conditions the need to use the 
status display board to constantly monitor and evaluate data is lessened. 
2.4.1.1 Modifications Requirements Due to LST 
Program loading requirements of the On-Board Processor and increases to the experimen­
tation data storage due to the wide band tape recorder will require modifications or replace­
ment of the existing OAO unique peripheral interface equipments such as the command mod­
ulator and the OAO PCM telemetry interfaces (OPTIs). Telemetered data changes will 
require changes to the Status Display board nomenclature and the corresponding lamp 
locations. Due to construction techniques, replacement of the entire upper portion of the 
Status Board will be required. 
Changes will also be required to update the test conductor consoles overlays and some growth 
to the displays on these consoles is estimated. 
New bit synchronizers to work with the faster wide band tape recorder dumps are assumed 
to be required. 
S-Band receivers at the remote sites will be required and it is assumed that changes to the 
STADAN facilities by 1976 will be adequate to handle the expected faster data dumps and 
uplink data command rates of the LST. The cost for STADAN facilities changes are not 
included in this study. 
Ground Station costs are not impacted by Shuttle considerations. 
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2.4.1.2 Modification Requirements due to Computer Changeover 
The existing ground station at GSFC will be updated from the present 930 computers to 
Sigma 7 computers. The 930's are no longer in production, and maintenance of obsolete 
computers will not be cost effective. 
The Sigma 7 has a 32 bit word size addressable as eight bit bytes. Additional modifications 
to existing unique interface devices such as the OAO command output generator (OPCOG) 
and the OAO PCM telemetry interface will be required to work with the Sigma 7. 
It is expected that new hardware would be required to update the X series circuits in the 
station to the newer integrated circuit T series type. Equipments such as the Parallel Input 
Extender (PINEX) and Parallel Output Extender (POTEX) would change due to the increased 
word size (24 bits to 32 bits) and the different timing requirements of the Sigma 7. 
Modifications to existing interfaces to take advantage of the 32 bit word size and timing will 
be incorporated wherever possible. 
Additional equipments that may require modifications or replacements are: 
" CRT Parallel Interface 
* Teletype Coupler 
* Digital to Analog Converter Interface 
* 360 System Interface 
* Modern Interfaces 
* Peripheral Switches 
o Simulator Interface 
Two Sigma 7 computers will be required, one acting as a backup. This dual concept has 
been proven with OAO experience to be necessary to allow for a sufficient uptime-downtime 
ratio. Another computer (3 total) will be required to update the Test and Integration Station. 
2.4.2 Test and Integration Station 
The Test andntegrationStationprovides the test engineer with the capability to execute 
spacecraft commands and monitor response data. In addition, the computer can monitor all 
data points from the spacecraft and inform the test engineer when an impermissible or unexpected 
change has occurred on other equipments. This capability provides constant spacecraft 
performance and detects any malfunctions that may occur. The existing Test and Integration 
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Station at GSFC will be modified for use during vehicle system integration as well as for 
support of the System Integration Test Stand used to integrate the spacecraft avionics. 
The Test and Integration Station uses a 930 computer similar to the one used for the Ground 
Station. The same assumptions regarding the computer applies here as for the one appli­
cable to the Ground Station. The commonality of the Test and Integration and Ground Station 
computers is maintained. One new computer is included with the station modification but is 
costed under item 1. 3. 
This station, with its computer, is moved with the vehicle from GAC to GSFC and to KSC. 
After launch, it is returned to start S/S integration for the next vehicle. Cycle repeats for 
each vehicle. T & I station changes required to work with new Sigma computer are: 
No. Req'd. 
Parallel Input Extender (PINEX) 1 
Parallel Output Extender (POTEX) 1 
OAO PCM Telemetry Interface (OPTI) 2 
OAO Command Output Synchronizer (OPCOG) 1 
Command Modulator (COMO) 1 
CRT Parallel Interface 1 
Teletype Coupler (TTY) 1 
Digital-to-Analog Converter interface 1 
Cabling Modification 
BIT Synchronizer *New Equipment 2 
Test Conductor Console's Bi-Level and 
Analog Display Panels 
When launching the LST with a Shuttle, the station will not be required for tests on the launch 
pad. Payloads enclosed in the Shuttle will have a final checkout in the Shuttle hangar prior 
to the move out to the launch pad. 
2.4.3 Programming
 
The following new computer programs will be required for the LST;
 
* 	 Simulation programs for the entire vehicle for the study of guidance and control. 
* 	 Simulation of the power subsystem and loads to study the power requirements of 
the vehicle. 
* 	 Simulation of the vehicles real time command and control responses. 
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* 	 Emulator of an on board computer for checkout of the on-board programs. 
* 	 Executive for on-board computer. 
* 	 Subroutines for Stabilization and Control, Data Processing, Command Processing, 
Power, Thermal, Modes of Operation, Experiments command and Operation. 
" 	 Computer self check diagnostics. 
* 	 Test and Integration checkoutroutines such as functional tests of the subsystems, 
EMC tests, vibration and thermal vacuum tests, prelaunch checks. 
In addition to the new programs, modifications to existing programming for mission opera­
tions are required: 
* 	 Modification of all control console software, display board software and operating 
software. 
* 	 Modify the star position programs to LST requirements. 
* 	 Modify mission contact and scheduling programs. 
* 	 New experimenter data handling software requirements. 
* 	 Diagnostics for checkout of ground station. 
* 	 Documentation of all central control station software. 
* 	 Remote site software. 
Programming is not affected by consideration of the Shuttle. It is assumed that only experi­
ment software changes will be required when systerm modules are changed. 
2.4.4 System Test Stand (STS)
 
A System Test Stand (STS) is a full scale framework of the LST spacecraft that is built to
 
permit easy access to all areas without or within the spacecraft for rapid integration of the 
subsystems. Subsystems are mounted on the framework in their respective position in the 
LST, with identical cable runs. The STS also provides simulation of missing subsystems so 
that it can be operated while S/S modules are in vendor repair. One STS will be provided 
for the LST program. 
The Cost of the STS is minimized by the use of the flight (prototype included) S/S modules. 
The Test and Integration Station will be used as the checkout station. 
It is assumed that experiment packages will be maintained by the experiment vendor, though 
maintenance capability does exist with a STS. 
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2.4.4.1 Titan Launch 
Subsystem development integration will be performed on the STS in parallel with the struc­
ture development and assembly, thereby reducing total development time and cost. This 
approach has shown to be cost effective in aircraft checkout and acceptance, and test sched­
ules in this study are based on a STS program. 
The STS can also be used for pre-installation test of S/S modules and experiments of follow­
on vehicles in addition to providing integration of any changes as technology progresses. 
2.4.4.2 Shuttle Launch 
* 	 Use STS as described previously. 
* 	 Use the STS to integrate new experiments with the spacecraft avionics for a resupply 
mission. It can provide a high level of confidence that the experiment change will 
be compatible with the avionics already in orbit. 
* 	 The STS can also provide a test bed for the spare modules keeping them in a "ready 
for installation" state, to support a resupply mission. 
" 	 Use the STS as bench maintenance equipment for repair of failed S/S modules, 
eliminating the need for procuring individual bench maintenance equipment early in 
the program. 
As the program progresses, and vendors are no longer supporting repair, their 
module acceptance stations, which have been paid for by NASA can be delivered to 
the LST test and maintenance area where NASA may now perform repair and 
refurbishments. 
* Any additional interfaces unique to the Shuttle/LST will be tested with the STS. 
2.4.5 Handling Equipment 
In determining the requirements for handling equipment, the following additional assumptions 
were made; 
* 	 Shipment from GAC to Goddard and Goddard to K,9C is made with LST "power-down", 
but with an air conditioned environment provided. Transportation will be by Guppy 
Aircraft with over-the-road transport between the airport and facility. 
* 	 Shuttle considerations do not impact shipping costs. 
* 	 In contrast to OAO, LST will be checked out, handled and transported in the hori­
zontal position, except for vibration, magnetic survey and thermal tests. This 
approach is taken to avoid the large cost of major facility modifications. In 
addition, transportation between sites is only economically possible with the LST 
in the horizontal position. 
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2.4.5.1 Equipment List 
The list is based on OAO experience. It is expected that future studies will be performed 
to define the exact requirements. 
* 	 Alignment Cube-Spacecraft - Required for reference to align various structural and 
add-on components to basic structure. 
* 	 Alignment Cube & Target - Telescope Support - Required for reference to align 
experiments and components to telescope support and for alignment with spacecraft. 
* 	 Alignment Gauges & Targets - For components (experiments, antennas, Solar 
Panels, S/S Pkgs.) to be aligned with spacecraft. 
* 	 Spacecraft Dolly - Combination handling, rotating dolly and support stand for use 
with workstand. 
* 	 Telescope Support Dolly 
a 	 Spacecraft Workstand - Platforms surrounding spacecraft to provide access to all 
parts of built up spacecraft. Sections break away for component installation and 
clearance. Overhead hoisting capability included for component handling. 
* 	 Telescope Support Workstand - This stand will fit together with the Spacecraft 
workstand to become an integrated test stand. 
e 	 Rotating Fixture - Required to orient the spacecraft and/or the telescope support
in the vertical attitude for vibration tests and for cleaning. 
* 	 Sling Set - For hoisting the spacecraft and the telescope support. 
* 	 Spacecraft Environmental Cover with Air Conditioning Cart - For use with dolly for 
moving spacecraft between facility buildings while maintaining environmental con­
trol. Also used for operations outside buildings. 
* 	 Vertical Spacecraft Dolly/Support - Required for operations on a vertical space­
craft. I (Work platforms will be temporary scaffold types.) 
* 	 Vehicle Covers/Soft Covers for protection within facility during shipping/handling 
operations. 
* 	 Optical Alignment Fixture - Modify OAO fixture - required for alignment of various 
spacecraft components with T.V. chamber table (air bearing). 
* 	 Weight and Balance Adapter - Modify LM equipment or build new E.I. - Required 
for moment of inertia determination of spacecraft and telescope support. 
* 	 Non-Magnetic Support Stand with Non-Magnetic Breakdown Platforms - For support 
and access to spacecraft during magnetic tests. 
* 	 Transporter - Air Conditioned - For over the road and air transportation of space­
craft, telescope structure (and possibly combination of both). 
* 	 Environmental Container Set - For transportation of experiments; subsystem pack­
ages, antennas and other vehicle components. 
* 	 Battery Handling Equipment - Installation equipment, checkout and handling carts, 
slings, temperature controlled package and storage equipment. 
* 	 Solar Panel Handling Equipment - Deployment aids, protective covers, handling 
containers. 
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* 	 Nitrogen Conditioning Equipment - Used for pressure systems and for purging (such 
as during stacking operations). Use existing OAO equipment. 
* 	 Pneumatic Conditioning Equipment - For servicing the stabilization and control sub­
system. 
* 	 Thermal-Vacuum Chamber Workstand - Support Stand with work platforms, access 
and penetration plates. 
* 	 Instrumentation and Service Lines Supports System - Routing and Support of lines 
leading from outside through vacuum chamber to .vehicle. 
* 	 Shroud Support Equipment (Supplied GFE) - Sling Set, wheels (or Dolly) access 
platforms. 
* 	 Environmental Enclosure - Used for maintaining air conditioned and cleanliness 
levels within less-clean environments. 
* 	 Interstage Adapter Handling Kit - Dolly, Sling, access platforms and adapter 
fixtures. 
o 	 Nitrogen Purge Conditioning Cart - For nitrogen purge of shroud during assembly. 
Use existing cards. 
Shuttle
 
The Shuttle program will require the following additional equipment
 
* 	 Shuttle interface equipment for use in loading LST into shuttle cargo bay. 
* 	 Docking Simulator - Used for mechanical and electrical checkout of docking inter­
face. 
Tentative operational sequence at launch site is: 
a. Vehicle arrives at launch site in horizontal position. 
b. Move to hangar clean room. 
c. Take out of shipping container. 
d. Inspect - visual. 
e. Install solar paddles. 
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f. Power on - aliveness and functional test: 
g. Install interstage adapter. 
h. Transfer to vertical position 
i. Assemble shroud and attach nitrogen purge lines. 
j. Place on trailer and move to pad - continue purge. 
k. Lift and install on booster. 
1. Final checkout through LST RF link. 
For the OAO/LST shuttle program only two of the four launch consoles will be required 
since there is no LST checkout on the pad. In addition, the tentative operational sequence 
(g) through (1) changes as follows: 
* Assemble shuttle payload shroud if required and attach nitrogen purge line. 
* Place on trailer and move to shuttle hangar. 
* Mount in shuttle cargo bay. 
* Connect LST/Shuttle umbilical. 
* Move to pad in shuttle. 
* No checkout on the pad. 
2.4.7 Trainers and Training
 
No special trainers or formal training will be required for a Titan program.
 
However, the shuttle introduces the capability for resupply and retrieval missions for which 
shuttle astronauts must train. Resupply and retrieval will not require an EVA, but will be 
performed remotely with control by the shuttle astronauts from their cockpit. 
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An existing shuttle simulator is assumed, with its attendant "executive" shuttle character­
istic program. The LST project will assume the cost of LST associated simulator models, 
programs and training for the LST Mission. 
2.4.7.1 Requirements 
* 	 Three models will be supplied for shuttle simulator training: two of an LST with 
its docking ring, and one of the cargo bay portion of the shuttle with strong-back 
and service module. The two LST models are for a distance view and the other for 
a close-up of a docking operation. Special cameras for sighting on the models will 
also be included in order to provide the visual display in the shuttle cockpit as 
would be seen in a normal mission. 
* 	 Costs are based on experience with the LM Simulator, which required a docking 
simulation with special cameras, models and programs. The cost of this portion 
of the simulator was approximately 3 million dollars out of a total simulator cost 
of approximately 15 million. 
" 	 All LST/Simulator computer programs and their integration with the "shuttle pro­
gram" is assumed included within the 3 million cost. 
2.4.8 Publications 
Formal publications will be kept to a minimum. 
When considering the shuttle program a Shuttle Crew Procedure Manual for a LST resupply 
mission will be required. 
2.4.9 Test and Checkout 
The LST test and checkout program is designed to achieve maximum confidence in mission 
success. This will be accomplished by subjecting the spacecraft to a series of tests which 
will most economically verify all modes and functions. Whenever technically feasible, the 
stimuli and measurements provided for checkout will have excitation and verification of all 
operational and redundant modes of the system under test. 
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In addition to the efforts involved in actual testing, the following associated tasks will be 
required: 
* 	 Definition of the integration and checkout requirements. 
* 	 Definition of site activation/test interfaces for GSFC and the launch site. 
* 	 Generation of a single checkout plan for flight articles. 
* 	 Inputs into a General Test Plan for flight and development programs. 
* 	 Generation of test procedure outlines. 
* 	 Generation and update of test procedures. 
* 	 Checkout of the flight and development articles. 
* 	 Test planning and control, supervision of the "test team". 
* 	 Preparation of test reports to summarize and highlight test data. 
2.4.9.1 Test Objectives
 
The major objectives of the LST test and checkout program are to:
 
" 	 Verify that the static and dynamic structural integrity is consistent with the launch 
environment. 
* Verify compatibility of the installed systems and experiments.
 
" Verify that all systems and experiments meet or exceed performance requirements.
 
" Perform test and checkout on all hardware for NASA approval and spacecraft
 
acceptance. 
" Reduce the risk of schedule delays by logically integrating the test and checkout of 
the spacecraft with the final phases of manufacturing assembly. 
2.4.9.2 Assumptions 
* 	 Subsystem and experiment modules will be designed, developed and qualified 
(including thermal vacuum) prior to delivery to contractor. 
* 	 There is no requirement for pre-installation testing of the subsystems and experi­
ment modules. Consistent with the design approach, each module is self contained 
and will undergo an acceptance test at the vendor. The vendor acceptance test will 
be approved by contractor and the actual test witnessed by contractor QC. All 
performance data obtained will be available for review by contractor test engineers. 
2-59
 
* 	 Thermal control for each module will be developed on the subsystem and experiment 
level since each is a thermally self contained unit. There is no interconnection be­
tween modules to a central heat transport system. Present design concepts are 
considering variable conductance heat pipes or louvers. 
* 	 The only costs considered that are associated with the manipulator are those for 
integration verification of the manipulator into the shuttle system. 
* 	 Thermal heat pipe systems have no active components. 
* 	 Solar panels will not be tested at the vendor. Panels will be installed and checked 
out at GSFC. 
* 	 The telescope alignment will be accomplished at the vendor. 
* 	 It is assumed that the support equipment engineers, together with the test engineers, 
accomplish the initial integration of the vehicle with the support equipment. 
* 	 The test planning effort includes test requirements definition and generation of a 
checkout test plan. 
* 	 To minimize cost, testing will be conducted on as high a level of assembly as 
practical and redundant testing will be minimized. 
" 	 A common test approach will be followed at each of the sites at which the vehicle 
will undergo test. 
* 	 During the period between actual checkout of each flight article a basic minimum 
number of personnel will be maintained actively on'the program. When checkout of 
a subsequent vehicle occurs the personnel will be drawn from the appropriate con­
tractor matrix organization to bring the staffing up to the required level. 
2.4.9.3 Development Test Program 
Figure 2-12 presents a typical OAO/LST development test schedule utilizing the mock-up, 
structural test article and system test stand. The major test elements used to arrive at the 
development test flow are presented in Table 2-5. 
2.4.9.4 Flight Article Test Program 
Figure 2-13 presents a typical OAO/LST test schedule for the first flight article. Differ­
ences between the schedules for a Titan and Shuttle are given in the explanations that follow. 
The major test elements used to arrive at the test flow are presented in Table 2-6. 
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Table 2-5. OAO/LST Development Test Elements 
VOLoo0,- OWE I 
TEST FUNCTION 
1. 	 Lines Run 
2. 	 Modules-MIechanical 
c/o 
8. 	 Launch Vehicle 

Interface 

4. 	 Docking 
5. 	 Manipulator/LST 

Integration C/O 

6. 	 Heat Pipes 
7. 	 Vibration 
8. 	 Steady State Loads 
(Static) 

9. 	 Systems Test Stand (STS) 
PUIRPOSE 
Establish cable length and 
routing. Establish pneumatic 
lines roueting and bend radii. 
Develop/verify module 
installation/removal. 
Verify EST/launch vehicle form 
factor compatibility. 
Verify liST/Shuttle docking/ 
separation capability. 
Develop/verify manipulator/LST 
removal/installation of subsystem 
and experiment modules. 
Verify pressure integrIty of 
thermal'control heat pipes, 
Verify EST structure's ability 
to withstand launch dynamic
environmenat. 
Verify EIST capability to with-
stand inertial loads of liftoff, 
boost, docking, and re-entry. 
Off vehicle development of inte-
grated subsystem and experiment 
modules. 
TEST FLOW PHASE 
Vehicle nmnufacture 
Vehicle design and 
manufacture 
Vehicle manufacture 
Vehicle manufacture 
Manipulator Design 
and development 
Development test phase 
Development test phase 
Development test phase 
Development test phase 
REQU ED FOR 
TITAN LAUNCH SHUTTLE LAUNCH 
Yes Yes 
Yes Yes 
Yes Yes 
No Yes 
No Yes 
Yes Yes 
Yes Yes 
Yes Yes 
Yes Yes 
FO'WJT FRAME 1 
REMARKS 
Shuttle requires additional development of latching 
mechanism and connectors. 
Shuttle requires development of docking mechanism. 
Docking is not applicable to Titan. 
Manipulator is not required for Titan. 
Pressure test oly. Heat transfer to be verified 
during thermal/vac. 
Vibration levels can be reduced and/or verified 
analytically, for shuttle, since Titan design launch 
environment is more severe. 
Same as above for static loads. 
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Table 2-6. OAO/LST Flight Article Test Elements 
REQUIRED FOR 
TEST FUNCTION PURPOSE TEST FLOW PHASE TITAN LAUNCH SHUTTLE LAUNCH REMARKS 
Subsystem 
I. Power S/S Module 
Installation 
Verify tructural/subsystem 
interface. 
, ybatteries 
Test & checkout/ 
pre-integration 
Yes Yes Solar panels will be simulated only. 
batteries will be used for checkout. 
will be replaced. 
Flight type 
Prior to launch, 
Verify electical power distri­
butio to all other module 
positions. 
2. Pnieumatic S/S Module 
Installation 
Verify structural/subsystemn 
interface, 
Veri pneumatic integrity 
throughout vehicle. 
Test & checkout/ 
pre-integration 
Yes Yes Module for Titan launch vehicle will not have pneumatic 
"Quick Disconnect" interface with spacecraft. 
Stability & Control S/S 
Module Installation 
Verify structural/subsystem 
interface. 
Test & checkout Yes Yes 
Verify "Copper Path" integrity 
between S&C SiS module & all 
other!imodule positions. 
4. Connnncations & Data 
Handling S/S Module 
nstllation 
Verify structural/subsystem 
interface. 
Verify "Copper Path" integrity 
between C&DH S/S module and 
all ot~er module positions. 
Test & checkout/ 
pre-integration 
Yes Yes 
5. Experiment Integration Verify struetural/subsystem 
interace. 
Test & checkout/ 
pre-integration 
Yes Yes All experiment test equipment will be supplied with the 
experiments as GFE. Where experiments are not 
available, a simulator will be utilized to duplicate the 
characteristics of the experiment. 
Verify "Copper Path" integrity 
between experiment module 
simulators and all other module 
positions. 
6. Heat Pipe C/O Load heat pipes and verify 
pressure integrity, 
Test & checkout Yes Yes 
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Table 2-6. OAO/LST Flight Article Test Elements (Cout.) 
REQUIRED FOR 
TEST FUNCTION PURPOSE TEST FLOW PHASE TITAN LAUNCH SHUTTLE LAUNCH REM1ARKS 
System 
1. Initial Integration Verify LST System Performance Integration System & Yes Yes Test perforhned with GSE plugged into the modules for 
on an integrated basis. Obtain 
System baseline data for sub-
EMI Verification simulation And simulation inputs/outputs. 
sequent testing. 
2. System CIO Verify under controlled EMI 
environment that the installed 
Integrated system & 
EI verification 
Yes Yes Test performed with minimal support equipment. 
Vehicle will be essentially flight configuration. 
system is compatible. Demon­
strate LST performance in 
typical mission modes. 
3. Weight & Moment of Determine LST weight and Weight & moment Pack Yes Yes 
Inertia moment of inertia, and ship 
4. Thermal/Vaouum Verify functional operation of GSFC Test phase Yes Yes Test will bJ accomplished at GSFC. 
all subsystem components under 
thermal/vacuuma conditions. 
5. Mechanical C/O Verify solar panels and sun Mechanical C/O Yes Yes 
shade deployment. Verify 
mirror alignment capability. 
6. Magnetic Survey Measure the 3 axids magnetic 
dipole of LST and provide for 
Mechanical C/o Yes 
Ist vehicle 
No Test will b, accomplshed i a cleared area for Tian 
program. For Shuttle launch, vehicle-compensation 
compensation, can be acconplished during in-orbit module replace­
ment. 
7. Telescope Alignment Adjust telescope alignment prior GSFC test phase Yes Yes 
to shipment to launch site. 
8. Experiment modules Verify "Copper Path" integrity OSFC test phase Yes Yes 
checkout between experiment modules and 
spacecraft. 
9. Vibration test Subject the LST to a low level 
vibration test with experiments 
GSFC test phase Yes Yes To uncover!workmanship defects that may not be 
discernilnby unstressed functional checks. 
installed. 
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" CheckoutActivities at Contractor: Tile testing flowbegins with the completion of thebasic vehicle structure with the required harness and includes the installation ofthe subsystems modules. Each subsystem module is checked in the spacecraft as 
well as the experiment interfaces. Any experiment that is not available for inter­
face checking and has a major interface with the spacecraft will require the use of 
an interface simulator. Further in the flow, the systems tests will Integrate the 
vehicle hardware and perform acceptance demonstration to the NASA. 
* 	 Vehicle Checkout at GSFC: After completion of normal inspection procedures the 
vehicle will have the experiments installed, the telescope aligned, and undergo a 
major system's test to include all functions. After which, the vehicle will be 
placed in the chamber and undergo thermal/vacum demonstration. Prior to 
undergoing an acceptance vibration test the solar panels will be installed. The 
vehicle will then undergo an acceptance test, after which, the telescope alignment 
will be checked and a complete functional test will be performed to demonstrate 
the spacecraft flight readiness after vibration and thermal vacuum. The OSFC 
test phase is identical for the Shuttle and Titan programs. 
* 	 Launch Site Operations: Launch site operations will be identical for the first 
vehicle of each program. Upon arrival at the launch site the vehicle will be in­
spected for shipping damage and undergo a complete functional test, including a 
telescope alignment check, to verify flight readiness. The pyroteclmic devices 
will be installed and checked and the vehicle will then be stacked into the launch 
system. Prior to launch the vehicle will undergo a reduced functional checkout to 
assure flight readiness, the pneumatics will be loaded and a final check of the pyre 
devices will be made. For subsequent flights on the Shutfle program the launch site 
checkout will be reduced since there will be no post-stack activities. Table 2-7 
lists the Launch Site test elements. 
2.4.10 Facilities 
A preliminary survey for preparation and activation of facilities required to support an LST 
program was performed. The use of existing facilities, modified and improved to meet 
program requirements was considered. Table 2-8 lists the requirements for these facilities. 
Shuttle considerations do not substantially impact the facility requirements. 
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Table 2-7. OAO/LST Launch Site Test Elements 
TEST FUNCTION PURPOSE TEST FLOW PHASE 
REQIIRED FOR 
TITAN LAUNCH SHUTTLE LAUNCH REMARKS 
1. Telescope Alignment 
Checkout 
Verify misalignment capability. Pre-stack checkout 
phase 
Yes Yes 
I 
2. LST Functional Verify subsystem and experiment 
modules are functional, 
Pre-stack checkout 
phase 
Yes Yes 
3. Pyre Installation and 
checkout 
Pre-launch installation pyre 
devices and pyre system C/O. 
Pre-stack checkout 
phase 
Yes Yes Shutte - Verify interstage pyros. 
4. Pneumatic Load and 
Checkout 
Pre-lamoh loading of pneumatic 
subsystem and checkout, 
Pro-stack checkout 
phase 
No Yes LST loag accomplished prior to loading vehicle 
into Shuttle. 
5. 
6. 
Pneumatic Load and 
Checkout 
LST Functional 
Pre-launch loading of pneumatic 
subsystem and checkout, 
Verify subsystem and experimeot 
Stack checkout 
phase 
Stack checkout phase 
Yes 
Yes 
No 
No 
LST loading accomplished after stacing vehicle 
on Titan. 
modules are functional after 
stack. As per assumption #10 Section II, payloads will not 
7. Pyre checkout Verify interstages pyre and 
resistance. 
Stack checkout phase Yes No 
be checked on the launch pad for the Shuffle program. 
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Table 2-8. Facility Requirements 
Facility 	 Location Requirement Work Effort 
(1) 	 Program Administration 
1. Prime Offices GAG P1 25/5 25, 000 Sq. Ft. 	 Renovate 
2. Action Center GAO P1 5 2, 000 Sq. Ft. 	 Refurbish, Displays 
3. Reproduction GAG Existing 	 None 
4. Documentation GAG Existing 	 None 
5. Publications GAO Existing 	 None 
6. NASA Team GAG PI 25 1,000 Sq. Ft. 	 Refurbish 
7. Off-Site Offices Goddard/KSC 1,000 Sq. Ft. Ea. 	 Rentals 
(2) 	 Computer Services 
1. GDS GAO Existing 	 None 
2. Analog GAO Pi 5 Existing 	 None 
(3) 	 Vehicle Simulation 
1. Models GAO Existing Model Shop 	 None 
2. Soft Moclup GAG PI 5 Mockup Hangar 	 Refurbish 
3. 	Inertial Moclmp GAG P1 4 Available Rangar Transport to Launcher 
Vendor 
4. 	 Lines Run Mockup GAG P1 5 Mockup Hangar See "Soft Mockup" for 
HRagar Rehab. 
(4) 	 Vehicle Manufacture 
1. 	Detail Ports GAG P1 02 Existing Shops 
2. Sub-Assembly GAG P1 02 Existing Shops 	 Minor improvements 
3. 	 Tool/Shop Support GAO 11 02, 03, 33 Existing Shops 
4. 	 Sub-Systems ) 
5. Final Assembly GAG P1 05 OAO Clean Room 	 Jigs/Fixtures
6. Mfg. Inspection GAG PI 05 LM Final Assy. Room 	 Refurbish 
7. Shroud GAG P1 02 Existing Shops 	 None 
S. Acceptance C/O GAG P1 05 LM F/A Room 	 See Mfg. Inspection 
(5) 	 Research/Development 
1. 	 Development Testing (iAC P1 05, Piping, Fixtures, Stands Site Rehab.
 
(Cold Flow Facility)

2. Research/Experiments GAG P1 14, 26, 31, Minor Improvements 	 Power, Air, Piping 
(Systems Test, Communi- 05, 12 Partitions 
cations, EMI, Meteorite 
Shields, Fluids) 
Facility 
(6) 	 Vehicle Test 
1. 	 Structural Test 
(Environmental Lab) 
2. 	 EMI Radiation 
(EMI Chamber) 
3. 	 Weight/Balance/Align. 
(OAO Clean Room) 
4. 	 Magnetic Survey 
(Magnetic Free Area) 
5. 	 Thermal Vacuum 
(Thermal Chamber) 
6. 	 Acceptance Test 
(NASA/Goddard) 
.7. 	 STS 
(OAO Clean Room) 
(7) 	 Test/Support/Control 
1. 	 Test Integration Sta. 
(Mfg. /Repair Shop) 
(Operations Room) 
2. 	 Qual. Test 
(Q. C. Labs) 
3. Product Support 
(GSE Fab.) 
(Spares/Supplies) 
(Support/Hold Areas) 
4. 	 Training 
(Training Centers) 
(8) 	 Material 
1. 	 Warehousing
 
(Warehouses) 

2. 	 Receiving 
(Receiving Docks) 
(Receiving Inspection) 
(Shipping) 
Table 2-8. Facility Requirements (Cont.) 
Location 
GAC P1 05 
GAC P1 05 
GAC P1 05 
GAO P1 14 
NASA/Goddard 
NASA/Goddard 
GAC 	PI 05 
GAC 	P1 33 
GAC 	P1 05 
GAC 	P1 10 
GAC P1 02, 03, 05 
GAC, NASA 
GAC, NASA 
GAC, NASA 
GAC 
GAC 
GAO 	P1 24 
GAC 
Requirement 
Rehab. 

Rehab. 

Partition, Hoist, Fixture 

Ballon, Compressor 

24' x 40' Chamber 

SITS 	Frame, Computer Room 

Utility Mods. 

Partitions, Floor, Rearrange 

Testing Labs, Existing 

Shop Modifications 

Warehousing 

Hoist, Fixtures, Utilities 

Mockup Facility, SITS 

Equipment 

Existing Bonded Areas
 
Existing Inspection Lab 

Existing Shipping Fac.
 
Work Effort 
Site Activation 
Site 	Activation 
Installation 
Site 	Activation 
None - by NASA 
None - by NASA 
Fabrication, General 
Erection 
Gen'l. Improvements 
Gen'l. Renovation 
None 
Minor Rehab. 
None 
Renovate Plt. 04 
Hangar
 
Renovate and Improve 
Plant 38 
Minor 
Improvements 
2 
Table 2-8. Facility Requirements (Cont.) 
Facility 
(9) 	 Operations/Services 
1. Control Centers 
(Control/Surv.) 
(Control/Surv.) 
(Control/Surv.) 
2. 	 Launch Operations 
(Assembly/Checkout) 
(Mating) 
(Pre-Launch C/O) 
(Launch Control) 
3. 	 Custodial Services 
(Clean Room Mtce.) 
(Final Assy. Room MTCE) 
4. 	 Recurring Technical 
Services
 
(Facilities Dept.) 
5. 	 Utilities 
(Power), 
(Communications) 
Location 
GAC P1 05 
NASA/Goddard 
NASA/KSC 
NASA/CKAFB 
NASA/KSC 
NASA/KSC 
GAc OAO Fac. 
GAC LM F/A 
GAC 
GAC 
GAC/NASA 
Requirement 
SACE Room 
NASA site Prep. 
GAC Support Offices 
and C/O shop 
Maintain NASA 
Requirements 
Liaison, Coordinate, 
Interface, Minor Change 
Assume 250 kw/4000 hrs/yr. 
TWX/Telemetry 
Work Effort 
Computer Room 
2500 Sq. Ft. 
Renovate 
Clean/Supply 
Uniforms, etc. 
2.4.11 Orbital Support 
Orbital support involves all the efforts directly related to spacecraft operation while it is in 
orbit. It comprises tracking, data acquisition, control, data processing and data analysis. 
It also involves the efforts for tracking and telemetry coverage of the launch vehicle from 
lift-off through spacecraft separation. 
With updated ground station equipment, the OAO Operations Control Center (OCC) will be­
come the OAO/LST OCC. This center will receive data from the spacecraft via microwave 
and high speed data links between GSFC and remote field sites, as presently performed for 
OAO. These field sites form the NASA Space Tracking and Data Acquisition Network 
(STADAN), which also performs the task of tracking the spacecraft. Ground tracking and 
early real time spacecraft status are also obtained with the assistance of the Manned Space­
craft Flight Network (MSFN). Appropriate organization and control procedures provide for 
coordination of the efforts between STADAN and MSFN. 
Some primary functions of the OCC are: 
* 	 Coordinate and direct the overall OAO/LST operation. 
* 	 Serve as the interface between the support computer programming system (SCPS) 
and the field site stations. 
* 	 Generate sequences and commands for transmission through each station to the 
spacecraft for the execution of the experiment program. 
* 	 Transmit the sequences to the stations. 
* 	 Accept status and experiment data from the stations. 
* 	 Display selected data. 
As the spacecraft data are fed back from the remote sites they will be processed in two areas: 
* 	 Real-time processing operations are performed by the Control Center Programming 
System (CCPS) during the contact. The Sigma 7 computer will analyze data from 
the spacecraft and drive all real-time displays such as the status display board, 
strip chart recorders, ClT, experiment displays, event printer, snap shots, com­
mands, schedules and contact schedule changes. 
* 	 Support computer processing (SCPS) will compute the actual spacecraft altitude 
from selected spacecraft status data. 
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During post-contact time, an in-depth analysis is performed on the data received from the 
last contact. From the analysis, personnel will monitor spacecraft trends and compare 
them with predicted trends and determine the cause and effect in case of spacecraft 
anomalies. When required, corrective action is taken. 
The Shuttle program introduces a new interface with the Manned Spacecraft Center (MSC) 
which is not required for Titan launch. An initial functional configuration of the interface 
is shown in Figure 2-14. With the Shuttle introducing in-orbit checkout prior to spacecraft 
release, the MSFN stations now must provide the data link for checkout in addition to launch 
tracking and early-orbit communication assistance. Control of the Shuttle is by MSC. Con­
trol of OAO/LST checkout is by GSFC. Additional organization and control procedures will 
be required to assure a coordinated effort for crew safety and a successful spacecraft de­
ployment. 
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Figure 2-14. Functional Configuration - LST/Shuttle Operations 
2.5 LAUNCH VEHICLE CONSIDERATIONS 
2.5. 1 Launch Environment Comparison - Titan and Shuttle 
The Titan IID7, which does not have a transtage as does Titan iC (a transtage is necessary 
for specialized orbits such as synchronous or near polar), can place larger payloads into 
conventional near-earth orbits. A payload capability envelope for the Titan IID7 is given in 
Fig. 2-15. It is seen that the LST is well within the Titan IIID7 capability for near-earth 
orbit. 
The following data show required design loads for the two Titan vehicles and the Shuttle: 
Preliminary Rigid Body Design Loads Comparison (Fit x 1. 5) 
Condition 	 Titan IITC Titan IIID7 Shuttle 
Boost Axial Compression log 9g 4. 5g 
Thrust Axis - Tension Rebound 5g S. 75g 
Lateral Steady State 5g 2.25g 3. 75g 
An examination of the three major design conditions reveals the following: 
* 	 Longitudinal Loading - It appears that axial compression will be more critical 
than tension rebound in all cases. The shuttle axial loads are approximately 
one-half (1/2) of the Titan environments. 
* 	 Lateral Loading - It can be seen from the data above that the maximum lateral 
loading on the Titan IMC is substantially higher than the Titan IIID7. This is due 
to the unsymmetrically weighted kick stage that causes strong coupling between 
orthogonal mode directions. For the purposes of this comparison we obtain a 
lateral Shuttle condition of 150% of the Titan IIID7 environment. The Shuttle how­
ever can provide at least two lateral support levels - probably at each end of the 
spacecraft, while the present LST-Titan prime support is only at one level (with 
the possible addition of aft end sway bracing). This lower loading coupled with a 
more favorable support pattern probably would reduce an LST-Shuttle lateral en­
vironment to the same as an LST-Titan HID7. As a very preliminary estimate, the 
axial load environment reduction (50%), (assuming a corresponding reduction in the 
shock, vibration and acoustic environment of a well isolated shuttle payload), might 
reduce the weight in the Structural-Mechanical area by about 20%. 
There are additional factors which could result in savings due to the softer shuttle ride. 
These are: 
* 	 Materials - The lower loads may allow the use of aluminum instead of titanium in 
several structures of the GSFC design. 
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* Testing - The sheer size and high accuracy requirements will extend beyond the 
present environmental test facility capabilities in some areas. It is possible that 
existing facilities may be adapted for the less harsh shuttle environment. 
* Fabrication and Tooling - Again, smaller loads, lighter structure, are more 
likely to be adaptable to present facilities. 
" 	 Failure Contingency - Lower loads should decrease possibility of failure, par­
ticularly if baseline design is not modified. 
* 	 Lower Vibration Environment - In the spacecraft compartment much OAO equip­
ment is used. The Titan environment probably would entail a requalification 
program, whereas the shuttle's more benign environment probably will save the 
cost of requalification of these equipments. 
2.5.2 Shuttle Characteristics 
2.5.2.1 Capability 
The baseline shuttle design selected for the economic study was GAC Design 518, consistent 
with major designs now being investigated for NASA by other contractors. The cargo bay 
volume is approximately 15 feet diameter by 60 feet long. The envelope of weight capability 
vs orbital altitude and inclination are given in Fig. 2-16 in the series of curves labeled 
"Design 518". A detailed acceleration profile is given below: 
Condition 	 Nx(g) N (g) Nz (g) 
Max Accel +3.0 -1.30 ±1.0 +2.5-2.7 
Entry -0.13 ±0.1 -2.2 
Landing -1.30 ±0.1 -2.7 
Maneuver -0.7 ±1.0 ±2.5 
Rebound & Lift Off +1.45 ±0.5 ±0.8 
2.5.2.2 Interface With LST 
(a) Structural 
1. 	 Lateral and longitudinal support is provided in two planes to avoid weight penalty 
of cantilevered support. 
2. 	 Deployment/Retrieval - The Shuttle will provide deployment, which will be 
rotational until LST is outside cargo bay. Deployment mechanism will include 
a docking mechanism for capturing LST for servicing, module replacement or 
return to earth. 
3. 	 Shrouding - LST can be transported to orbit within a pressurized module with 
thermal control or simply installed in the unpressurized bay. Dry nitrogen purge 
will be used for protection of optics and electronics during hold prior to lift-off. 
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(b) 	 Electrical 
1. 	 Power available from Shuttle for use by LST:
 
Type: D.C. 120 Volts (may become 28 volts)
 
A.C. 400 Cycles 120 Volts. 
Quantity: 500 Wats available. More could be made available if necessary. 
2. 	 R orientation data updating 
2.5.2.3 Docking
 
The permissible envelope of the shuttle in docking is summarized below:
 
Distance, Angle and Velocity Alignment 
Parameter 	 Baseline Design 
Miss Distance-Centerline ±15 in. 
Miss Angle Centerline ±4 degrees 
Rotation Angle ±4 degrees 
Contact Velocity 0-0.5 ft/sec 
Fully automatic systems have not yet been developed. Manual systems have been well 
demonstrated in Gemini and Apollo. Size of shuttle and offsets between eyeball, docking 
ports and centers of gravity may generate real or apparent control-axes cross-couplings 
during docking. These problems will be defined by simulators and solved during the de­
velopment of the shuttle. It appears reasonable to assume standoff docking manually con­
trolled with optics and/or closed circuit TV and sensors aids will be the mode of docking. 
The docking mechanical means will be androgynous, comprising two sets of leaves arrayed 
in conical fashion. One set is stationary and located at the base of the LST spacecraft 
structure. This docking ring will have a 60 in. dia. clear opening through its center. The 
other set, which is mechanically articulated, is located at the end of the service module 
attached to the shuttle. The usual nose docking by the shuttle will thus not be employed; 
instead, docking with the LST deployment and service module will require crew training 
through simulation. The mating conical leaf docking ring design allows great latitude in 
approach parameters, as shown in the data above, and greatly facilitates a manual docking 
procedure.
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The articulated docking ring, which is stowable and deployable and which can vary leaf 
angle, can also rotate through 3600 and lock at any of four stations 900 apart. Docking 
operations will be monitored by closed circuit TV augmented by three-dimensional capa­
bility for accurate depth perception, so that the operation may be quickly and easily 
accomplished. 
Regarding visibility and illumination in docking, the solar angle diagram Fig. 2-17 gives 
the acceptable range. Sunlight incidence angles between 60 and 140 degrees are acceptable. 
For sun angles of less than 60 degrees, sun shafting through the docking viewport or sun 
incidence causing veiling (light scatter in the viewport optics) are distinct possibilities. 
For sun angles of greater than 140 degrees, the Shuttle's own shadow may cause obscuring 
of the LST docking port and target. 
2.5.2.4 Service Module 
After docking with the LST, the service module has the capability to remove and replace 
modules in both the spacecraft subsystems and experiment groups. The service module is 
illustrated in Fig. 2-18, lower left, in which the storage containers for modules to be re­
placed are clearly shown. A typical sequence of module exchange is shown at lower right. 
This procedure is monitored by three-dimensional television, highly desirable for precision 
placement of the modules. 
The prime feature of the service module is that package exchange is accomplished by remote 
manipulator, not by astronauts directly in an EVA mode. Thus the spacecraft and equipment 
to be handled need not be man-rated, thus enhancing crew safety and generating savings in 
lead time and cost. Fig. 2-19 shows the manipulator operating with the subsystem modules 
(left) and the experiment modules (right). 
The manipulator capability follows: 
(1) Extract and replace any of three kinds of modules: 
9 	 Rectangular boxes 48" x 90" x 18" and up to 2000 lbs in weight. Fig. 2-20 shows a 
typical module. 
e 	 Wedge shaped modules located above rectangular boxes in experiment compartment, 
32 in radial depth (100 in OD) x 37 in average height, x 70 in chord. Typical ex­
periment packages are shown in place in Fig. 2-21. Weights of these packages are 
up to 500 lbs. 
* 	 Cylindrical on-axis instrument module 86" long x 54" diameter, approximately 
1000 lbs, also shown in place in Fig. 2-21. 
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(3) Extract replacement unit. 
(4) Install replacement unit. 
(5) Perform zero g test of primary mirror. As shown in Fig. 2-22, the remote manipulator 
has the capability to receive the primary mirror in its cell with supporting structure, a tele­
scopic light shield and figure sensor. The strong back deployment structure is extended, 
carrying the figure sensor to the center of curvature of the mirror and opening the light 
shield behind it. The shape of the mirror in zero g, as determined in such testing, after 
manufacture and launch in 1 g, would go far toward early achievement of diffraction-limited 
performance. 
Weight Breakdown of Remote Manipulator 
The following weight analyses of the strong back and remote manipulator has been made: 
Main Beams 750 Lbs. 
Secondary Structure 250 Lbs. 
Erection Beams/Cylinder 425 Lbs. 
Miscellaneous Supports/Hardware 50 Lbs. 
Active Docking Mechanism & Rotary Platform 500 Lbs. 
Support Carriage & Drive 
Docking Support Structure/Mech. 
Elevator Mechanism 400 Lbs. 
Resupply/Service Module Support
Launch/Re-entry Support 
Snubbers 75 Lbs. 
Structural Tie/Release 
2450 Lbs. 
Of the 2450 lb., structure accounts for 1150 lbs. and the remaining 900 lbs. are allocated 
to controls, actuator cylinders an4mechanisms. 
U 
2-85 
'<11 
SUPOR STUTR 
ZEROIE GYGF 
SUPPLIED BY GSFC 
Figure 2-22. Zero G Optics Tests Facility 
I mI II II ll II II I I II IIa III IaI aII
 
3. PROGRAM COSTS AND COST ELEMENT BREAKDOWN 
In order to provide realistic cost estimates for the OAO/LST economic analysis, the approach 
taken was to obtain costs for major program elements from both the data bank and cost esti­
mting relationships of the Central Pricing Group of the GAG contracts department and from 
the OAO/LEM-based experience of the engineering and manufacturing discipline areas. Due 
to the wide application of OAO and GAO-type hardware on the OAO/LST, actual OAO compo­
nent subcontract costs were used as the basis for predicting costs of the LST hardware. 
Wherever possible, comparable OAC experience costs are presented for LST line Item costs. 
Costs for GFE equipments, Government facilities, and support manpower were supplied by 
GSFC via telecon and letter. Titan launch vehicle costs were obtained from the Martin Cor­
poration publication, "Payload User's Guide" and verified by GSFC. 
3.1 PROGRAM COST ELEMENTS 
As per USFC request, the cost elements were displayed as shown in Tables 3-1 and 3-2, and 
form the basis for subsequent accumulation into broader categories for presentation purposes. 
OAO experience costs were obtained from the GAC/OAO Program Office Contracts GroupH and from GSFC-supplied information. 
The LST design baseline against which these costs were estimated is described in Section 2, 
together with assumptions and groundrules used in making these estimates. 
Cost element line items appearing in Table 3-1 were accumulated to derive the total contrac-Itor price for the spacecraft. Table 3-2 lists government costs, including GFE hardware 
items. 
The columns headed 'Shuttle Unique" costs include those additional costs necessary to make 
the Titan baseline design compatible with the Shuttle launch and resupply operations. 
3.2 HARDWARE COMPONENT COSTS 
The component lists shown in Tables 3-3 through 3-7 were obtained from the GSFC-supplied 
LST baseline design, through meetings with GSFC personnel, and descriptive material pro­
vided. Item costs were estimated with the assistance of the OAO contracts group and project 
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..... Table 3-1. OAO/LST Cost Elements (Dollars in Thousands) FIOrT PPAI e 
CAO EXPERIENCE 1 ) LST - DESIGN BASELINE 
COST ELEMENT (4 )  
(2)DEVEL THRU 
A-2 LAUNCH 
REPEAT FLT 
(OAO-C) COST 
DEVEL THRU 
PHOTO FLIGHT 
REPEAT FLIGHT (5)  
COST (TITAN) 
SHUTTLE UNIQUE COSTS 
1st UNIT RECURRING 
Notes, 
SYSTEM DESIGN (TEST/INTEG/OPS) 1. No GFE Included 
- System Design Engr'g 
- Project Mgmt 
11,900 
8,200 
1,000 
2,028 
23,765 
4,246 
1,032 
1,514 
2. Includes Prototype A-2 
A-i, B-B/C (stopped), 
- Structure LST (InclSee Mech) (6) 
- Thermal (Purchased Parts/Mat'l) (6) 
12,200 6,414 
Included in Struct. Above 
23,492 
1,644 
8,626 
1,241 
(3)4,797 (3)1,357 and B-Recovery ofHardware.I 
- S/C Mech (See Mirr Adj/Rad Select) (6) 6,190 1,234 3. Additional Costs for 
- Test & Support Equipment (GSE) 
- Subsystem Test Stand 
- Devel. Test (Manpower) 
8,900 
4,000 
9,500 
1,220 7,254 
1,246 
849 
924 
110 
98 
module replaceability. 
(Guide and Latching 
Mech, etc.) 
- Flight S/C Icnteg & C/O (Contr) 
- S/C Support Team at GSFC & KSC 
2,500
2,250 
1,477
3,700 
1,328
2,742 
955 
2,482 4. Cost elements include 
- S/C Operations Team (2 Yra) 
- Ground Station (Hdw & Software) 
1,500 1,826 
Included in GSE Above 
2,016 
8,086 
1,826 Qual Assur, G & A, 
Fee, and Materials 
Handling Charges spread 
STAB. & CONTROL SUBSYSTEM proportionately on 
System Contract 
- Hardware Contract 
Total 63.7 M 
1,854 
3,020 
3,248 
5,376 
2,938 
4,088 
appropriate items. 
5. 90% learning curve applied 
to recurring cost of 1st 
unit (Protolight) to obtain 
PNEUMATICS SUBSYSTEM 2nd unit cost. 
- System Contract Included in S & C Above 873 790 6. Consider as part of struo­
- Hardware Contract 380 246 ture subsystem. 
Total 
CDHS SUBSYSTEM 
- System Contract 1,613 1,082 980 
- Hardware ContractTotal 28 M 3,900 6,767 3,677 
ELECT. POWER SUBSYSTEM 
- System Contract 
- Hardware Contract 
1,100 
1,436 
1,026 
2,390 
927 
1,838 
- Solar Arrays 
Total 14 M 
840 3,300 2,800 
- Facilities (at Contractors) 2,011 1,618 
-
-
Titan Interstage (6) 
Structure 
Total Contractor Price 
Included in Struot. Above 
166,950 31,428 
1,577 
110,898 
628 
40,364 5,005 1,357 
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FOLDOUT FRAME 
-
IOLDOUT MME Table 3-2. OAO/LST 
Cost Elements (Dollars in Thousands) 
OAO EXPERIENCE LST - DESIGN BASELINE 
COST ELEMENT 
DEVEL TURU 
A-2 LAUNCH 
REPEAT FLT 
(OAO-C) COST 
DEVEL THRU 
PHOTO FLIGHT 
REPEAT FLIGHT 
COST (TITAN) 
SHUTTLE UNIQUE COSTS 
lst UNIT RECURRING 
GSFC COSTS 
1 - Project Management 
2 - Facility Modifications 
3 - Exp Test SE 
4 - Telescope - (Optics) 
5 - Telescope - (Structure)
6 - Offset Tracker 
7 -Radial Insts 
8 -On-Axis Inst 
9 - T &E Division 
10 - USFC Support 
11 - OCC Hardware 
12 - OCC Softwre 
13 - Track & Data System (OTDS) 
Total (Above) 
( 
(Included in line 9, below) 
( 
23,840 15,000 
,8j 
14,785 8,868 
8 00 22,000 
:33 2,460 
6 130 (2,452) 
3,500 
8,800 
2,000 
6,200 
11,530 
3,520 
4,000 
14,000 
5,500 
03,00 
(5,000) 
67,550 
2,5 
3. 00O 
1,000 
2,900 
3,130 
750 
3,000 
10,000 
4,500 
2,500 
(3,000) 
33,280 33,280 33,280 
OTIHER COSTS 
- Launch Vehicles Titan 
-Resupply Platform (1st Unit Cost) 
-Shuttle (Operational Cost) 
22,500 22,500 
24,850 
5,000 5,000 
Total GSFC and Other 90,050 55,780 63,130 38,280 
TOTALS/Flight 200, 948 96,144 
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Table 3-3. Communications and Data Handling Cost Elements 
QUANTITY TOTAL QUANTITY 
DESCRIPTION (NOMINAL) RECURRING NON-RECURRING (NOMINAL QUANTITY (MINIMUM) 
Diplexer (OAO) 1 $ 20,000 $ 100,000 $ 120,000 1 
Command Recvr (OAO) 1 $ 110,000 $ 110,000 1 
Narrow Band XMTR (OAO) 1 $ 30,000 $ 8,500 $ 38,500 1 
Command Decoder 2 $ 31,500 $ 3,500 $ 35,000 2 
Telem Format Control 1 $ 45,000 $ 5,000 $ 50,000 1 
On-Board Processor (OAO) 1 $2,085,000 $1,315,000 $3,400,000 1 
Comp Oper Monitor 1 $ 20,000 $ 20,000 1 
Narrow Band Tape Rec 1 $ 125,000 $ 125,000 1 
Wide Band Tape Ree 2 $ 225,000 $ 500,000 $ 725,000 1 
Wide Band XMTR (S-Band) 2 $ 150,000 $ 17,000 $ 167,000 1 
Pwr Ampi & RF Sw 1 $ 10,000 $ 20,000 $ 30,000 1 
Wiring Harness 1 $ 5,000 $ 15,000 $ 20,000 1 
Multiplexer 2 $ 13,500 $ 1,500 $ 15,000 1 
Pwr Converter (Digital) 2 $ 30,000 $ 30,000 2 
Hybrid Junction (VHF) 1 $ 10,000 $ 10,000 1 
Hybrid Junoction (S-Band) I $ 10,000 $ 20, 000 $ 30,000 1 
TOTALS: $2,920,000 $2,005,500 $4,925,500 
NOTE: Minimum Cost Package eliminates w.essential redundancy 
=am m mmw m a mma 
Table 3-4. Stabilization and Control Cost Elements 
QUANTITY TOTAL QUANTITY 
DESCRIPTION (NOMINAL) RECURRING NON-RECURRING (NOMINAL QUANTITY) (MINIMUM) 
Fixed Head Tracker 2 $ 110,000 $ 5,000 $ 115,000 1 
Dig. Sun Sensor Elect. 1 $ 25,000 $ 25,000 0 
Inert. Ref Unit & Elect. 2 $1,500,000 $1,500,000 2 
FWJC Controller 3 $ 500,000 $ 250,000 $ 750,000 3 
Magnetometer (OAO) 2 $ 30,000 $ 30,000 1 
Wheels (Scaled Up OAO) 6 $ 600,000 $ 250,000 $ 850,000 3 
Inverter 2 $ 270,000 $ 200,000 $ 470,000 2 
Dig. Sun Sensor 4 $ 32,000 $ 32,000 0 
Remote Decoder 2 $ 31,500 $ 3,500 $ 35,000 2 
Multiplexer 4 $ 27,000 $ 3,000 $ 30,000 2 
Wiring Harness 1 $ 5,000 $ 15,000 $ 20,000 1 
Magnetom Elect. (OAO) 2 $ 25,000 $ 25,000 1 
Solar Aspect Sensor (OAO) 4 $ 20,000 $ 20,000 4 
RAPS Eyes 
SAS Electronics 1 $ 15,000 $ 15,000 1 
Mus. Signal Processor 1 $ 15,000 $ 15,000 1 
TOTALS: $3,205,500 $ 726,500 $3,932,000 
NOTE: Minimum Cost Package eliminates unessential redundancy 
Table 3-5. Pneumatics Cost Elements 
DESCRIPTION QUANTITY RECURRING NON-RECURRING TOTAL 
Gas Tanks (OAO) 3 $ 18,000 $ 9,000 $ 27,000 
Regulator (OAO) 2 $ 20,000 $ 20,000 
Valve Shut-Off (OAO) 3 $ 39,000 $ 39,000 
Piping 1 $ 10,000 $ 10,000 
Wiring Harness 1 $ 1,500 $ 5,000 $ 6,500 
Pneumatic Conn's 12 $ 25, 000 $ 25,000 
Fill & Dump System 1 $ 1,500 $ 500 $ 2,000 
Solenoid Valve (OAO) 16 $ 64,000 $ 64,000 
Gas Jets (Nozzles) (OAO) $ 10,000 $ 10,000 
TOTALS: $ 189,000 $ 14,500 $ 203,500 
NOTE: All components essential for spacecraft survival 
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Table 3-6. Electrical Power Cost Elements 
TOTAL MINIMUMQUANTITY 
DESCRIPTION (NOMINAL) RECURRING NON-RECURRING (NOMINAL QUANTITY) QUANTITY 
Batteries (OAO) 6 $ 720,000 $ 720,000 6
 
Batt Chg Control 6 $ 600,000 $ 150,000 $ 750,000 6
 
Multiplexer 2 $ 13,500 $ 1,500 $ 15,000 1
 
Diode Box (OAO) 1 $ 30,000 $ 30,000 1
 
PwrDist Unit 1 $ 15,000 	 $ 15,000 1 
1Cmnd Decoder 	 2 
TOTALS: 	 $1,378,500 $ 151,500 $1,530,000 
NOTE: 	 Solar Cells, see Table 3-1 
Minimum Quantity required for spacecraft survival 
I 
UTable 3-7. Electrical and Wiring Cost Elements 
DESCRIPTION QUANTITY RECURRING NON-RECURRING TOTAL 3 
Fusistor & Pyro 
Struct Heaters 
Antenna S-Band 
Antenna VHF 
2 
2 
$ 1,500 
$ 1,200 
$ 25,000 
$ 25,000 
TOTALS: $ 52,700 
NOTE: All components required for spacecraft survival 
$ 
$ 
1,500 
1,200 
0 
3 
$ 75,000 $ 100,000 
$ 75,000 $ 100,000 
$ 150,000 $ 202,700 
personnel. The package costs shown here do not include the cost of the subsystem module 
structures. These are covered in the structural estimate, Table 3-1. Subsystem design, 
test and production costs for the completed modules are also shown in Table 3-1. It should 
be noted that the Offset Tracker, a major cost item and the only significantly new hardware 
development required for the LST fine pointing and stabilization, is not included in the Stabi­
lization and Control Subsystem Module but is a separate, GFE module associated with the 
Scientific Experiment Instrumentation and Telescope costs. This is in keeping with OAO 
program experience in which the fine error signal for OAO spacecraft pointing is derived 
from the Goddard Experiment Package and the Princeton Experiment Package in OAO's B 
and C, respectively. 
Another major hardware cost item is the Secondary Mirror Adjustment mechanism, whose 
purpose is to maintain the optical alignment and focus of the primary and secondary mirror 
combination despite the relative displacements caused by thermal and mechanical environ­
mental changes. The cost of this mechanism was supplied by GSFC and accumulated under3 
the line item of S/C mechanisms, Table 3-1. 
Replaceable subsystem module costs were estimated on the basis of present OAO state of 
technology and, as discussed in Section 4, represent specific fixed points on the subsystem 
vs. MTTF cost curves. These project the costs of increased redundancy and extending 
technology to achieve greater MTTF values. 
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S Tables 3-3 through 3-7 are also used to obtain the costs of the minimum redundancy package 
by eliminating all but essential equipment redundancy for spacecraft survival. However,5since no specific attempt was made at this time to incorporate an independent, low-cost 
backup set of components, a minimal savings resulted from this approach. A more cor­
prehensive analysis of subsystem level of redundancy vs. cost optimization is recommended 
for future effort in this area. 
3.3 EXPERIMENT AND PRIMARY OPTICS COSTS 
3. 3.1 Experiments 
A breakdown of experiment costs relative to flyable spacecraft is shown here. This reflects 
the fact that experiments can very well be completely different instruments from mission to 
mission, and in any event would be substantially changed so that some development costs 
would be involved for each. 
Prototype Flight Art. 2nd Flight Art. 3rd Flight Art. 
On-Axis Exp Pkg $14 M $10 M $10 M 
Radial Exp Pkgs (3) $ 4 $ 3 $ 3 
Total Exp Cost $18 M $13 M $13 M 
3.3.2 Primary Optics 
These are very long lead time items, especially the primary mirror. Thus to protect the 
program schedule, one more set of optics will be manufactured than the number of vehicles. 
In this way a failure of the prototype optics in manufacture or transport, for example, would 
be covered by the available back-up set. If not used for the prototype, the back-up would be 
available to cover a failure in the optics of a succeeding vehicle. 
Offset Tracker 
Primary Mirror Secondary Mirror Flat 
Prototype Flt Art. $2.2 M $.65 M $.45 M 
Spare (Back-Up) Set $2.0 M $.50 M $.40 M 
2nd Flt Art. $2.0 M $.50 M $.40 M 
3rd Fit Art. $2.0 M $.50 M $.40 M 
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3.3.3 Radial Experiment Selector I 
This is a mission-success mechanism which inserts a diagonal flat mirror into the primary 
optical path to divert the light to the radial experiments. The mirror is capable of rotation 3 
to switch the light to a selected experiment. However, when on-axis experimentation is to 
be resumed, the mirror must be retracted from the primary optical path. If the mechanism 3 
fails to do this, the on-axis experiment is disabled. 
The mechanism will be assumed attached to the on-axis package, and therefore replaceable 
with the on-axis experiment. As such, the selector falls in Group 2 Reliability category. 
Cost is estimated as $.50 M for prototype and $. 36 M for 2nd and 3rd Flight Articles. 
3.3.4 Offset Tracker I 
This is a mission-success sensor which is incorporated in one of the four radial bay modules 
and is replaceable in orbit. The function of this sensor is to generate the spacecraft fine 3 
pointing error signal using the guide star light diverted from the primary optical system by 
the 450, offset tracker flat. Cost is estimated as $3.52 M for the prototype, and $0.74 M 
for 2nd and 3rd Flight Articles. 
3.4 SUBSYSTEM COST SUMMARY 5 
Table 3-8 presents the summation of the cost elements into the categories listed. It should 
be noted that certain major cost items (telescope structure, offset tracker, and experiment 5 
instrumentation) are categorized under GSFC costs and do not appear in the subsystem cost 
comparison of Table 3-9. When comparing OAO experience and LST design baseline cost 
estimates, it should be remembered that, with the exception of the structure, the IST sys­
tems are essentially the same type hardware (and same state of technology) that has been 
developed on the OAO program and is available today as flight qualified hardware. In con­
trast, the major load-bearing portions of the LST structure have been specified as fabricated 
from Titanium with the total structural weight being approximately 11,000 lbs. 
3.5 TOTAL PROGRAM COST SUMMARY 
The total OAO/LST program cost summary is presented in Table 3-9 in the format requested 
by GSFC so as to provide a comparison of the 6-Flight Titan-launched program with the 3­
flight Shuttle-launched program. The Shuttle-launched program includes a first flight on 
Titan, 3 additional service and instrument package update Shuttle flights, and the develop­
ment cost of the automated servicing module. 5 
3 
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Table 3-8. Subsystem Cost Comparison - OAO Vs. LST (Dollars in Thousands) 
u m msss
 
COST ELEMENT 
System Design, Test, Ops. 
Structure Subsystem 
Stab. &Control Subsystem 
Pneumatics Subsystem 
Comm. & Data Handling Subsystem 
Electrical Power Subsystem 
Total Contr. Price 
OAO EXPERIENCE 
DEVEL. THRU REPEAT FLT. 
A-2 LAUNCH COST 
48,750 11,251 
12,200 6,414 

63,700 4,874 

Included in S & C 

28,000 5,513 

14,300 3,376 

166,950 31,428 

LST DESIGN BASELINE 
DEVEL. THRU REPEAT FLT. 
PROTO. FLT. COST 
53,553 10,351 
32,903 11,729 
8,624 7,026 
1,253 1,036 
7,849 4,657 
6,716 5,565 
110,898 40,364 
I 
3Table 3-9. Total OAO/LST Program Summary (Dollars in Thousands) 
6 FLIGHT - WITHOUT SHUTTLE SHUTTLE PROGRAM 3 
Proto Flight Proto Flight (Titan L/V) 
Contr. - 110,898 Contr. - 115,903
 
Gov't. - 67,550 Gov't. - 67,550
 
Launch - 22,500 Launch - 22,500
 
200,948 205,953 
 U 
2nd. Flight 2nd. Flight (Shuttle L/V) 
Contr. - 40,364 Contr. - 41,721
 
Gov't. - 33,280 Gov't. - 33,280
 
Launch - 22,500 Launch - 29,850 1
 
96,144 104,851 
3rd. Thru 6th. Flight 3rd. Flight (Shuttle L/V) 3 
Contr. - 143,500 Contr. - 39,200
 
Gov't. - 108,200 Gov't. - 31,000
 
Launch - 90,000 341,7000 Launch - 5,000 75,200
 
Total Program Total Program 
Contr. - 284,762 Contr. - 196,824
 
Gov't. - 209,030 Gov't. - 131,830 
 I 
Launch - 135,000 Launch - 57,350 386,004
 
638,792 3 Inst.
 
Update - 54,000 54,000
 
440,004
 
3 
It should be noted that in both cases the prototype flight includes the non-recurring develop­
ment costs as well as the cost of the first flight article and that the costs of succeeding flight 3 
articles are reduced on a 90% learning curve. 
Table 3-10 presents the same information in comparison with costs for the OAO flight space­
craft. 5 
55 
3-12 I 
mummmu ammuMmm.lm a1 imm 
Table 3-10. Program Cost Comparison (Dollars in Thousands) 
OAO 6 IST - WITHOUT SHUTTLE 3 IST - SHUTTLE 
Through Second Flight S/C Proto Flight S/C Proto Flight S/C 
-213,875 - 178,448 - 183,453 
3rd Flight S/C 2nd Flight S/C 2nd Flight S/C 
- 83,251 - 73,644 - 75,001 
4th Flight S/C 3rd Flight S/C 3rd Flight S/C 
- 57,956 - 69,300 - 70,200 
4th Tbru 6th Flight 3 Sets Instr 
- 182,400 - 39,000 
Prog Total (Less Launch) Prog Total (Less Launch) Prog Total (Less Launch) 
- 354,082 - 503,792 - 367,654 
3.6 COMPARISON WITH OAO COST EXPERIENCE 
Tables 3-1, 3-2, 3-8 and 3-10 provide comparative costs for OAO, LST-Titan, and LST-
Shuttle cost elements and flight spacecraft. 
Figures 3-1a, b and 3-2a, b show graphically the relative importance of the major cost ele­
ments for LST development and recurring flight spacecraft in comparison with similar OAO 
program cost elements. Most apparent in this comparison is the shift in relative cost be­
tween the stabilization and control subsystem, which was the most costly single element 
during OAO development, and the spacecraft structure. This, together with the telescope 
becomes the most costly element of the LST development program. 
Since much of the OAO Stabilization and Control subsystem hardware is applicable to the 
LST mission, the extensive component development, analysis and test required for OAO 
stabilization functions need not be repeated. The capability to replace subsystem modules 
in orbit provides the program flexibility of using prototype equipment for early flights 
and updating by shuttle resupply, thus eliminating the risk of system failure or serious 
degradation and permitting reduction in both component redundancy and development test. 
On the other hand, the LST structure as described in Section 2 is significantly different in 
both concept and requirements from the OAO structure. While the resupply mode permits 
a reduction in requirements for the replaceable modules, the major structural items must 
provide mechanical integrity through ground testing, Titan launch, and years of orbital 
operation. It should be noted, however, that fabrication of the structure entirely from 
aluminum, rather than the extensive use of titanium presently specified, would result in a 
considerable cost savings. An average cost-complexity factor of 2-4 can be applied to 
titanium fabrication as compared with conventional aluminum fabrication costs. 
Annual program costs for the OAO/LST Baseline program without Shuttle and comparable 
annual costs for OAO program experience are presented in Figures 3-3 and 3-4. It should 
be noted that the peak expenditures for the projected OAO/LST program do not significantly 
exceed those of the on going OAO program. 
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Figure 3-1. Development Cost Comparison 
(Percent of Total Development, Including Prototype) 
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Figure 3-2. Recurring Flight Unit Cost Comparison 
(Percent of Total Spacecraft Costs) 
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3 	 4. METHOD OF ANALYSIS FOR OAO/LST SHUTTLE PROGRAMS 
4.1 SUMMARY OF METHODOLOGY
 
Cost in the OAO/LST program is generated as: Nonrecurring development and hardware,
 
recurring cost per flight, and steady state operating cost. Each of these areas are, in turn,
 
subdivided into cost items sensitive in varying degrees to over-all system characteristics
 
3 called cost drivers. These cost drivers, through their influence on operational and design 
I 

costs, will, as they vary, cause major fluctuations in the over-all program cost of the
 
OAO/LST. The cost impact analysis problem then becomes one of describing the inter­
relationships of cost drivers and program characteristics, and then committing these inter­
relationships to an analytic method capable of exercising them and outputting the results inI terms of system performance and cost. In this way will cost drivers and their impact on the 
program be related. Analysis of these results leads to conclusions on optimum cost driver 
values and the definition of an optimum system point design. A flow diagram of this processEl is presented in Fig. 4-1. 
mI 4.2 RELIABILITY AND MAINTAINABILITY 
The following reliability/maintainability oriented cost driving relationships were developed 
-E for this study: 
* 	 The relationship between MTTF and cost 
* 	 The relationship between resupply interval, uptime ratio, MTTF and cost.U| The establishment of these relationships required the performance of mission, system, and 
design analyses. These analyses were completed with the use of computer programs and 
modeling tools which had been developed as part of the GAC reliability/maintainability space 
advanced development effort. The computer programs and modeling tools were:3 . Multi-state effectiveness model (MARKAP)
 
Markov models which evaluate the probability of being in various system states.
 
* 	 Availability Apportionment Model (APPOR) 
Calculates the availability (uptime ratio) from MTTF values for each combination 
of shuttle resupply frequency, and delay time. 
5| Distributes availability goals (uptime ratio goals) on a system level down to the 
subsystem and subsystem functional level taking into account the differing design 
factors of each item.I
 
!
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Figure 4-1. OAO/LST Shuttle Economic Analysis Technique 
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I These programs and aids were utilized to perform the following specific tasks. 
* Mission requirements analyses
3 e System analyses
 
* 	 Subsystem and subsystem function availability apportionment. 
3 
U 4.2.1 Reliability/Maintainability Cost Driver Analysis 
The R/M tasks completed for this study represented a comprehensive analysis of the R/M 
I 
 measures which affect the LST economics. These tasks identified which measures were
 cost drivers, and provided a credible analytical base upon which LST cost vs. program 
effectiveness tradeoffs could be performed. 
I 
34.2.2 Mission Requirements Analyses
 
Group definition and group composition, the subtasks from which mission requirements
 
analyses are composed, required an analysis of the LST hardware which was replaceable, 
redundant, necessary for the success of the LST mission, necessary for the full per­
formance of the LST mission, and/or necessary for the survival or resupply of the LST 
vehicle. Thus the following groups of hardware were defined for the LST vehicle and mission: 
* 	 Group 1: Nonreplaceable, Nonredundant Mission Success Group 
Equipment considered essential for mission success which has no redundancy. 
5[ 
 * Group 2: Replaceable Redundant Mission Success Group
 Equipment considered essential for mission success which is redundant. 
* 	 Group 3: Replaceable Redundant Mission Degradation Group 
Equipment which is considered to be necessary for full mission performance, 
but whose loss is not considered to be the loss of mission success. This group
is redundant. 
o.	 Group 4: Survival and Docking Group 
3 
Equipment which is considered essential for the performance of docking or to 
prevent catastrophic failure. Catastrophic failure is considered to be a failure 
which renders the LST useless for the mission under consideration. 
IOnce the group definition subtask was completed the specific hardware which composed each 
group was determined. 
3 4.2.3 System Analyses 
4.2.3.1 Data Collection 
L The collection of MTTF Data was the first subtask accomplished as part of the system 
analysis task. This collection was carried out on three levels: (1) OAO, (2) LM, and 
3 
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(3) AIRCRAFT. The data utilized were actual flight data whenever possible for the same 
hardware or similar hardware. When flight data was not available data estimates made on 
previous programs were used. In the absence of both of the above, engineering judgement 
was used to generate selected data. 
The result of this subtask was MTTF data or data estimates on every piece of LST hardware 
for all three design levels. 
4.2.3.2 State Definition 
* Shuttle 
The analysis of LST alternatives required that the system interaction be described 
by system conditions or states and transitions between these system states. These 
system states are generated by a subset of the set of all possible failure and repair 
combinations of the system. For the purpose of this study ten (10) states of theLST system have been defined. 
State 1 - Al equipment up.
 
State 2 - Failure of nonreplaceable redundant equipment.
 
State 3 - Failure of replaceable redundant equipment.
 
State 4 - 2 out of 3 radial experiments up.

State 5 - 1 out of 3 radial experiments up.
 
State 6 - No radial experiments up. (Group 3)
 
State 7 - Survival Group up. (Group 4)

State 8 - Group 2 and survival group up.
 
State 9 - Repair via shuttle.
 
State 10 - Catastrophic failure.
 
* Titan 
The system states for the Titan LST system are defined to be: 
State 1 - All equipment.
 
State 2 - Failure of redundants.
 
State 3 - 2 out of 3 radial experiments up.
 
State 4 - 1 out of 3 radial experiments up.
 
State 5 - No radial experiments up.
 
State 6 - Catastrophic failure.
 
4.2.3.3 Mode Definition 
* Shuttle 
The 10 LST states may be combined into four (4) mission modes which describe 
different levels of LST performance. These four modes and their state composi­
tion are given below: 
Mode 1 - Full Performance Mode: ability to carry on all desired experimental 
activities with the desired accuracy. 
Mode 2 - Degraded Performance Mode: ability to carry on only the on-axis experi­
ment, or the on-axis experiment with one of two experiments with the desired 
accuracy. (States 4, 5, and 6). 
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3 Mode 3 - Survival Mode: loss of experimental success but survival functions still 
exist allowing for maintenance. (States 7, 8, and 9).3 Mode 4 - Catastrophic Failure Mode: loss of spacecraft and the ability to restore 
it to satisfactory operation. (State 10).
 
0 Titan
 
The six (6) LST states which are defined for the Titan replacement sequence can be 
combined into three of the four modes given above. The Titan mission modes are: 
Mode 1 - Full Performance (States 1 and 2).U 
Mode 2 - Degraded Performance (States 3, 4, and 5).
 
Mode 4- Catastrophic Failure (State 6).
 
These states and modes are shown in Figs. 4-2 and 4-3.
 
3| 
U 4.2.3.4 Group Block Diagrams and Math Models 
The LST reliability diagrams were drawn up from the data of three technologies: Aircraft 
Level, LM Level and OAO Level. Wherever possible, failure rates used were from actual 
recorded discrepancies of the 3M* run for similar type equipment at the aircraft level.USimilarly failure rates were gathered from LM and OAO data. For the items for which there 
were no data, predicted values and engineering judgment was used to arrive at the failure 
rates for each equipment. Once the data were gathered, the failure rates and MTTF wereU 
calculated for each subsystem for each of the above mentioned technologies. All redundancy 
5 was assumed to be standby redundancy. That is, whenever a failure occurs, the redundant unit would be energized and assume the function of the failed equipment. 
I Figure 4-1A is an example of the actual group block diagrams which are given in detail in 
enclosure (4) of the Appendix (Vol. I). The figure shows how the group failure rates (X 
failures/hr.) were generated as the sum of the individual subsystem failure rates. This 
summation was carried out for each of the three levels given above. The MTBF (MTTF) 
given in the figure is the reciprocal of the failure rate (MTTF = 1/X). 
Each of the subsystem blocks given in the figure were developed from subsystem block dia­
grams where the subsystems contained previously developed hardware. Figure 4-1B is an 
example of the subsystem block diagrams given in detail in enclosure (4) of the Appendix.
I The figure shows the Communications and Data Handling subsystem diagram for the OAO 
*Navy field failure data compiled on Maintenance, Material, and Management of naval air­
craft for distribution to major Navy contractors. 
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U 
level. The subsystem failure rate was generated by serial-parallel reduction of the hard- 3 
ware failure rates given in the figure, assuming that all redundancy is of the stand-by type. 
For the stand-by redundancy case, reduction of a serial-parallel system requires the summa- 5 
tion of the MTBF's of the parallel elements (since each redundant element in effect increases 
the life of the 'block" of parallel elements by one (1) MTBF), and the summation of the re­
suiting "block" failure rates (Zi Xi or i (1/MTBFi), i = number of blocks) in a manner 
analogous to serial-parallel reduction of a resistance network. This reduction was carried 
out on all these levels for all applicable subsystems. 
The specific group failure rates obtained from this analysis were utilized as the matrix ele­
ments for the input to the MARKAP program. The subsystem and element failure rates were 
utilized in the development of the cost vs. MTTF relations as given below. 
4.2.4 Availability Apportionment
 
The availability apportionment task is designed to generate data for the R & M Apportionment
 
Program APPOR. The accomplishment of two major tasks are required to develop this data.
 
These tasks are subsystem apportionment, and subsystem functional apportionment.
 
The availability Apportionment Program (APPOR) is a tool, generated by R & M advanced 
development, which uses LST MTTF (mean time to failure) goals and shuttle schedule delay 
times to compute subsystem MTTF apportionments. These MTTF apportionments are used 
in a cost model, to evaluate overall LST costs. The subsystem apportionments are also 
used to generate the subsystem functional apportionments by again employing the APPOR 3 
program. 
The mission requirements analysis and system analysis tasks provide a good insight into the 
effect changes in the level of failure rate for groups of equipment have on the uptime and 
availability of the LST system. In order to enhance the credibility of the availability estimates 
the availability apportionment model independently calculated the availability estimates from 
the MTTF values for each combination of shuttle resupply frequency and delay time according 3 
to the procedure given in Sec. 5. These estimates were then apportioned first to the sub­
system level and then to the subsystem function level. 3 
The core of the apportionment model is the technique of using weighting factors to evaluate 5 
the relative contribution of each subsystem to total LST system performance in terms of 
U 
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I uptime ratio or MTTF. The following factors were of importance, in varying degrees, to 
LST hardware:
 
3 * 
 Cost 
* Nonreplaceability
3 * Criticality
 
* 	 Design inflexibility
 
Environment
 
Design complexity 
0 	 Weight. 
Each of these factors was assigned a weight to indicate its relative importance, and each LST 
I subsystem was ranked by engineering judgement for each of the factors. The relative con­
3 tribution of each subsystem was calculated as a linear combination of its judgement values and their respective weighting factors. The apportionments were then made in proportion 
to the total weight of each subsystem. In this manner a very realistic apportionment is 
3 achieved. 
U 
Specifically, the LST Apportionment model consists of a main program and two subroutines, 
with the capability of calling the costing model as a subroutine. The main program APPOR 
first calls subroutine UPTIME which uses ten candidate 1ST MTTF goals and seven shuttle 
schedule delays to calculate and print the expected uptime and uptime ratios for the seventy 
U combinations. The seventy uptime ratios are transferred back to APPOR which apportions each LST uptime ratio to the subsystem level and prints the results. The subsystem MTTF 
apportionments are then transferred to the LST cost model. 
U These apportionments enhance the credibility of the LST system uptime ratios since they 
3 relate these ratios to actual subsystem functional level MTTF requirements. These re­quirements provide a crosscheck to the level estimates using the "Top-Down" approach 
U since this approach, which is based on the designer t s estimate of the possible achievement of his hardware, indicates the design feasibility of the level estimates. 
U 4.3 COST VERSUS MTTF 
Select modules of the LST subsystems considered to be replaceable in orbit were identified 
at the black box level and their functions categorized. A search was made of in-house 
historic data, and vendor quotations of cost and MTTF of modules performing similar 
functions on LM, OAO, and various aircraft programs. Basic data areas utilized in thisU 
U	 4-11 
analysis are shown in table 4-1. The aircraft programs were further subdivided into 
military and commercial (707 type) aircraft categories. 
Table 4-1. Information Source Areas for Cost Vs. MTTF Analysis 
Cost Comparison Modules 
Electrical Power 
Batteries 
Inverters 
Regulators, Controls, Distribution 
Communication & Data Handling 
VHF Transceiver 
S-Band Transmitter 
Wide Band Transmitter (S-Band) 
Command Receiver 
Narrow Band Transmitter 
Command Decoder 
Telemetry Format Control 
On Board Data ProcessorMultiplexer
Diplexer 
Wiring Harness 
Data Link 
Tape Recorders (wide and narrow band) 
Stabilization & Control 
Inertial Reference Unit 
Inertial Reference Electronics 
Sensor Electronics (digital) 
Remote Decoder 
Signal Processor 
Multiplexer 
Wiring HarnessInverter 
Pneumatics
 
Tanks
 
Solenoids
 
Regulators
 
The data obtained was then correlated to provide a best guess for those modules where data 
was not available for each technology. 
4U 
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UThe data for each replaceable subsystem was then summed to provide the equivalent cost of 
subsystems designed to each technology. The module MTTF data was similarly utilized to 
determine equivalent subsystem MTTF's. 
UThis data was then compiled to Indicate the effect of cost variations for each subsystem
 
based on commercial aircraft (707 type), military aircraft (A6A type), OAO, and LM
 3 technologies.
 
U The VHF transceiver curve given in Figure 4-5 is based on actual data received from several vendors quoting prices and reporting actual in-use MTTF values at the technologicalU levels indicated. 
Typical subsystem MTTF vs. cost curves generated from a composite of functional compo­3i nent data for the communications and data handling, stabilization and control, and electrical 
power subsystems are shown in Figures 4-6 A, B, and C. The OAO/LST flight article cost3 	 vs. MTTF curve shown in Figure 4-7 was generated according to the procedure given
 
pictorially in Figure 4-4. The development of the curve utilized a regression analysis to
 
determine the best fit curve through the cost MTTF data points. It was found that an
 
equation of the form:
 
x
 
= costreference (MTTF/MTTFreference)cost 
3 was appropriate for all replaceable subsystems, where the value of "x" fell between 1.0 and 
3 1.25. The cost elements from which Figure 4-7 was generated included fixed costs and some costs whose variability was not assessed, as well as the variable cost of the replace­
able subsystems. 
U 4.4 SHUTTLE-DESIGN TRADE-OFF 
Since the Shuttle, through in-orbit repair, in effect extends satellite lifetime, a methodology 
is required to describe the trade-off between Shuttle revisit cost and the cost of additional 
satellite life. Fig. 4-8 has been developed to show this relationship between Shuttle flight 
U
 
U
 
U 
U 
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cost and the cost of achieving increased satellite MTTF through improved design. Con­
sidering that each Shuttle revisit adds an increment of life equal to (1) MTTF, the cost of a 
Shuttle flight may then be compared to the cost of adding (1) MTTF through improved design 
and production. Since this means doubling the MTTF, the cost to double MTTF was taken 
from the upper set of curves (Fig. 4-8) and plotted, producing the lower set. The addition 
of various Shuttle flight costs defines levels of MTTF above which use of the Shuttle is 
economically preferable, and below which improved MTTF through design is best. 
4.5 COST/OPERATION COMPUTER PROGRAM 
A mathematical model to study performance and cost (PERCOM) was devised to assist in 
the spacecraft system optimization process. A digital computer program of this model was 
developed and exercised. This program (PERCOM) relates spacecraft and total program 
costs with the system performance characteristics of: 
* System Repair Delay 
* Satellite MTTF 
* System Uptime Ratio and Years 
* Nominal System Cost 
The system repair delay is that span of time elapsing between the occurrence of a failure 
and its repair. This time may be entirely devoted to readying and launching expendable or 
re-usable boosters, or it may be taken up in part by administrative procedures and equip­
ment testing and readying. For system performance analysis purposes, repair delay is 
considered as dead time during which the satellite is in a survival mode and is not perform­
ing any experimental activities. 
Satellite MTTF is the mean or average life expectancy between the achievement of opera­
tion and the occurrence of a failure requiring repair. If a satellite cannot be repaired in 
orbit, the MTTF is the average life expectancy after which a replacement satellite must be 
launched for continued experimentation. Where in-orbit repair may be done, the MTTF is 
the average expected operating life after each repair. By adding repair delay to the MTTF, 
the time required for a complete operation-failure-repair cycle can be approximated. 
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Figure 4-8. Cost Effectiveness of Shuttle Repair 
4.5.1 Program Inputs 
PERCOM inputs are: 
* Program costs for baseline Shuttle assisted OAO/LST 
* Baseline MTrF level 
* Cost vs. MTTF slope for replaceable subsystems 
* A range of selected MTTF levels 
* A range of selected Shuttle schedule delays 
The program is actually run for combinations of MTTF and schedule delay. 
4.5.1.1 Program Costs 
The Grumman data base of OAO experience was utilized to provide estimates of the costs of 
various elements of the EST. With the exception of the structure, telescope and scientific 
instrumentation, the LST systems are the same type as that available as flight qualified for 
the OAO program. Therefore, the OAO subcontractor costs, systems design, integration, 
test and operations data was extrapolated to provide estimates for the LST program. 
The program cost elements were then organized and used as inputs to the computer program 
(PERCOM). The cost data fell into three major categories as defined below. 
4.5.1.2 Fixed Costs 

Items in this category were assumed to have a fixed cost. This included: mission operations,
 
experiment update flights, ground stations, facilities, structure, primary optics, test and
 
support equipment, Titan interstage and shroud, Shuttle interfaces, and launch operations.

4.5.1.3 Not Assessed Variable Costs
 
Items in this category were assumed to have a variable cost. However, variations in their 

cost as a function of their cost drivers were not assessed at this time. For the purposes of
 
this study their costs were assumed to be constant. 

Items included are: engineering, thermal, S/C mechanisms, system integration, program 
management, reliability, quality acceptance, and experiments. 
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4.5.1.4 Variable Costs 
Items in this category were assumed to have a cost which would vary with its mean time to 
failure (MTTF). Equipment in this category included: stabilization, electric power, 
communication and data handling, and the pneumatic subsystems. 
4.5.1.5 Baseline MTTF Level 
A baseline level of MTTF of 12 months was selected as representing the current level of 
full-up performance of current OAO systems. While a satellite might survive and function 
longer than that, its performance would be degraded. 
4.5.1.6 Cost vs. MTTF Slope 
As discussed earlier in this section, slopes of 1.0 and 1.25 were taken as the range of in­
crease of cost with increasing MTTF. 
4.5.1.7 Range of Selected MTTF Levels 
In order to explore the impact of MTTF as a cost driver, it was parameterized to have a 
range of values from 3 months to 48 months. This range was selected to explore both 
"cheap" and advanced state-of-the-art hardware. 
4.5.1.8 Range of Selected Shuttle Schedule Delays 
While Shuttle turn-around is projected at two weeks, the total delay between a known failure 
and the Shuttle's visit may be much longer. To test the impact of this program variable, a 
range of delays from two weeks up to two years was used. 
4.5.2 PERCOM Outputs 
The PERCOM computer program calculates the program data to provide equipment uptime 
and cost outputs. A typical computer output is shown in Fig. 4-9. It can be seen that the 
cost data falls into three categories; 1) non-recurring, 2) recurring and 3) operational. 
PERCOM output includes: total program cost, viewing time (uptime) in years, uptime 
ratio in years, total number of equipment failures in 15 years, and the cost of Shuttle 
repair flights additional to that required to update experiments. 
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5. ANALYSIS OF RESULTS
 
5.1 CARPET PLOT TECHNIQUE
 
Outputs of the PERCOM computer program, when plotted, form a series of intersecting 
families of curves or carpets as described in this section. 
The baseline LST program calls for 6 launches to provide a program uptime of 9.5 years 
at a total program cost of $640 million. 
The LST program with Shuttle availability calls for the launch of one prototype on a Titan 
booster, with subsequent vehicle launch, refurbishment and repair flights performed by the 
Shuttle. A comparison of the Titan-launched and Shuttle assisted programs appears in 
Fig. 5-1. 
5.1.1 Carpet Plot Format 
The basic format for OAO/LST program carpet plots appears in Fig. 5-2. The ordinate is 
total program cost, broken down into fixed, variable but not assessed, and assessed 
variable cost categories as shown. On this graph, the abscissa is program uptime or total 
viewing time available. The total viewing time available for the LST program is the 
summation of the individual viewing periods. The average length of a viewing period is 
equal to the MTTF. 
5.1.2 Constant MTTF Curves 
MTTF's considered for the vehicle varied from 3 months to 48 months. At a constant 
MTTF, an increase in program uptime is gained by Shuttle revisits. Each Shuttle revisit 
increases the program uptime by one MTTF and increases the program cost by the cost 
of a Shuttle flight. A line of constant Shuttle schedule delay (1. 5 months) is shown in 
Fig. 5-2. This line indicates the maximum uptime obtained from the maximum number of 
operating cycles that can be accomplished in a 15 year program. 
The plot can be divided into two separate and distinct areas, in each of which, one particular 
cost driver predominates. From 3 month MTTF to the lowest cost line (9-12 months), 
the cost of Shuttle revisits exerts the greatest effect. Beyond the minimum cost line, cost 
of increasing MTTF dominates. 
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At the lowest MTTF considered (3 months) the large number of repair/maintenance visits adds 
heavily to program cost. As the MTTF is increased, the reduction in number, and thereby 
cost, of Shuttle flights outweighs the increase in cost resulting from increasing MTTF through 
design. This yields lower program costs. 
The cost of increasing MTTF through designHowever, at a certain point the balance shifts. 

begins to rise faster than the reducing cost of Shuttle trips falls, thereby yielding increas­
ingly higher program costs.
 
5.1.3 Shuttle Schedule Delay Lines 
Shuttle schedule delays which varied from a low of 0.5 months to a maximum of 24 months 
were considered. The shortest Shuttle delay of 0.5 months resulted in the highest program 
uptime for each MTTF. As the schedule delay is increased from this value, both uptime 
and program costs are reduced. 
The period represented by Shuttle delay is devoted not only to Shuttle turn-around, but also 
includes payload preparation and loading, and administrative delay. 
5.2 RESULTS INTERPRETATION 
The graph of each line of constant Shuttle schedule delay runs through a low or saddle point 
denoting the minimum cost program for that delay. This minimum also occurs at specific 
values of MTTF and system uptime, thereby setting values for all of the major cost drivers. 
As seen in Fig. 5-3, with increasing uptime, the envelope of the minimum cost program 
The value of the minimum programshifts from a 3 month MTTF up to a 12 month MTTF. 
cost rises at the same time. 
If a specific value of uptime is selected as a program goal, the programs available to 
achieve that uptime are represented by all points on the line clearly, increasing or decreas­
ing MTTF from the minimum cost point results in a higher program cost. Lower MTTF 
programs require shorter schedule delays and more flights to achieve the required uptime; 
while higher MTTF's allow longer delays, but use increasingly more expensive hardware. 
It is important to note the concentration of MTTF lines around the trace of saddle points. 
This indicates that program costs and cost driver values are relatively insensitive to 
moderate variations in MTTF about the optimum. Since the optimum MTTF's in the area 
of interest approximate current experience, it may be concluded that the minimum cost, 
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maximum performance OAO/LST program will utilize the Shuttle and will require no 
advance in the MTTF state-of-the-art beyond current capability and design experience. 
The attendant reduction in program cost and performance risk is clear. Further, if the 
desired MTTF is not achieved in practice, a measurable increase in program cost at 
the lower MTTF and a shorter Shuttle delay will still yield the same uptime. Alternatively, 
for the same program cost, some uptime may be sacrificed. Another conclusion to be 
drawn directly from the graph on Fig 5-3 is that Shuttle delays of up to 6 months will not 
materially reduce program effectiveness or alter cost. 
The graph of Fig. 5-4 is an expanded plot of the carpet plot area of Fig. 5-3, and is pre­
sented for clarity purposes. Fig. 5-5 is a replot of Fig. 5-4, but with number of flights 
as the abscissa. It therefore represents a 90 ° rotation of the prior plot. In this graph as 
in prior ones, the bunching of delay lines illustrates the system's relative insensitivity to 
variation in Shuttle schedule delay. To present a total picture of the OAO/LST program, 
an uptime scale has been added; however it applies only in the shaded area of the curve. 
That shaded area traces the path of saddle points giving the lowest cost programs. 
In order that the Shuttle-launched system can achieve the same degree of science that is 
offered by the six instrument changes on the Titan-launched system, the same number of 
instrument changes is required. This means that in addition to the initial Titan launch, 
five additional Shuttle flights are required. From Fig. 5-5 It may be concluded that with 
the higher MTTF's above 24 months or with the lowest uptime programs less than six 
flights are required. Using six flights as a minimum program to achieve equal experiment 
capability, it may be seen that MTTF's much in excess of 24 months are unusable for a 
program with a maximum uptime of 14 years; and that for the lower MTTF programs, delays 
up to 12 months are acceptable. 
The graph of Fig. 5-6 is presented to illustrate the impact of a sharper slope to the cost of 
MTTF. Where on Fig. 5-4 the 36-month MTTF program cost of almost $650 million, the 
1.25 slope of Fig. 5-6 produces a 36-month MTTF program cost of over $770 million. The 
minimum cost programs, however, remain within $20M of the corresponding points on the 
former graph. As can be seen, then, the most cost effective program is relatively insensi­
tive to the slope of the cost vs. MTTF curve since the use of current technology (MTTF 
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expectations ranging from 9 to 18 months, based upon actual flight data) yields minimum 
program costs and it is only in advanced technology programs that variations in MTTF cost 
appear. Further, if an investment is to be made, it should go into higher performance 
equipment and not longer life. Clearly, even a halving of present lifetime expectancy from 
12 months down to 6 does not significantly impact program cost to achieve the same uptime. 
Fig. 5-7 is the 90 rotation of Fig. 5-6. 
5.2.1 Sensitivity to Variable Shuttle Revisit Costs 
OAO/IST unit cost and required MTTF are relatively insensitive to the cost of a Shuttle 
revisit. Fig. 5-8 illustrates the insensitivity of total program cost to Shuttle revisit cost 
variation. 
5.3 ECONOMIC RESULTS WITH AND WITHOUT SHUTTLE 
5.3.1 Study Results 
The results of the study, comparing OAO/LST program costs with and without shuttle, are 
assummarized in Figure 5-9. These costs reflect a program for continuing astronomy 
discussed in paragraph 1.3 and represent 6 spacecraft and 6 Titan launches for the baseline 
program with 3 spacecraft with 1 Titan and 2 Shuttle launches with 3 additional Shuttle revisits 
for resupply and experiment changes for the economic comparison of the Shuttle program. 
Making these experiment changes with the Shuttle program represents a $91 million savings 
as compared to achieving the same degree of flexibility without the Shuttle. This savings is 
summarized In Figure 5-10. Comparing the two programs in Figure 5-11 shows that large 
amounts of additional uptime, or spacecraft operational time, is achieved with the Shuttle 
program for a small increment in increased costs compared with the large increase in costs 
required without the Shuttle to gain the same degree of uptime. 
Figure 5-12 compares the most important characteristics for the OAO/LST programs with 
and without the Shuttle. In all cases, the Shuttle enables a higher uptime, lower program 
cost, and a lower MTTF with its attendant reduction in technological complexity and risk. 
Although the carpet plot analysis shown in detail in Section 5 shows that a minimum cost 
program is achieved with a 12 month MTTF satellite, or at current state of the art achieve­
ment for MTTF's, we have used a 24 month MTTF satellite for comparative purposes since 
this satellite will represent some degree of degraded performance and is more consistent 
with the resultant degraded performance that will accrue to the 36 month MTTF requirement 
for the OAO/LST program without the Shuttle. 
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Figure 5-10. OAO/LST Experiment Change Cost Comparison 
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Figure 5-13 has been developed to show the relationship between Shuttle flight cost and the 
cost of increased satellite MTTF. Considering that each Shuttle revisit adds an increment 
of life equal to (1) MTTF, the cost of a Shuttle flight may then be compared to the cost of 
adding (1) MTTF through improved design and production. Since this means doubling the 
MTTF, the cost to double MTTF was taken from the upper set of curves and plotted to pro­
duce the lower set. The addition of various Shuttle flight costs defines levels of MTTF above 
which use of the Shuttle is economically preferable, and below which improved MTTF through 
design Is best. From Figure 1-6 it can be seen that the Shuttle revisit costs can approach 
$20 million before it becomes cost effective to improve MTTF through design. This is true 
regardless of whether we use a 1. 25 or a 1.0 power slope. This analysis has shown that the 
Shuttle program can contribute a cost savings to future spacecraft design and development 
that goes far beyond the savings that accrue due to the low cost transportation provided. 
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6. STUDY CONCLUSIONS
 
6.1 STUDY CONCLUSIONS 
This study has identified several important economic advantages that will accrue to future 
scientific spacecraft programs that had not been realized before. In summary these are: 
* 	 Spacecraft savings of $137M 
* 	 Launch vehicle savings of $63M 
* 	 Program savings of $200M 
* 	 Shuttle allows experiment change-for $91M savings 
.	 Annual funding requirement comparable to OAO program 
* 	 Schedule delays of up to 6 months due to Shuttle availability or turnaround time 
do not significantly affect GAO/LST Program costs 
a 	 Shuttle availability makes current spacecraft technology adequate for OAO/LST 
m'ison 
* 	 Shuttle flight cost can go to $20M before state-of-the-art MTTF improvements 
become cost effective for today's OAO-LST mission 
* 	 Tomorrow's mission requirements can be met with more cost effectiveness 
through Shuttle repair rather than design improvements for increased MTTF 
* 	 Shuttle availability minimizes uncertainties in GAO/LST performance and total 
program cost 
.	 Low OAO/LST program sensitivity to Shuttle payload capacity 
* 	 Increased science capability through instrumentation update 
* 	 Orbital resupply enables higher uptime ratios 
* 	 Observation cost per year reduced 
* 	 The ability to repair failures allows the more demanding missions of the 1970's to 
be met with existing technology, thereby 
* 	 Allowing initial program estimates to be established with confidence at acceptable 
levels 
* 	 Preventing cost growth 
* 	 Offering management options for cost reductions over prior experience by 
* 	 Reducing the number of missions required 
* 	 Reducing costs by lowering MTTF requirements 
* 	 Re-use of retrieved hardware 
* 	 acecraft program cost reductions of 27% are achieved for LST based upon existing 
techology 
* 	 Abort capability with Shuttle eliminates mission loss due to spacecraft or L/V 
failure 
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7. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FUTURE EFFORT 
U 	 7.1 STUDY RECOMMENDATIONS 
U This study has indicated that a more detailed future effort should be instituted that would examine the economic impact of OAO/LST point design optimization utilizing the shuttle. 
It is therefore recommended that the following tasks be pursued: 
Task 1 Subsystem Level of Redundancy vs. Cost Optimization 
Task 2 Subsystem Level of Maintenance Optimization 
Task 3 System Dynamic Simulation - To determine Impact of Design Guidelines 
Task 4 Assess Impact of Additional Cost Variables 
Task 1 will involve the use of a dynamic programming technique which will evaluate the 
possible combinations of cost and number of redundant units in each lST subsystem. The 
program will then select the subsystem design alternative or set of alternatives which pro­
duce the greatest probability of success for a given cost. 
U 
Task 2 includes the analysis of cost versus the level, (module, blackbox, or subsystem) at 
which in-space maintaining will be performed. Various levels of maintenance for each LST 
subsystem will be investigated and their cost impact evaluated to insure that the LST is re­
supplied at the most cost effective level. 
U Task 3 will involve an actual simulation of a 15 year I.ST mission under various resupply,E delay, MTTF, level of redundancy, and level of maintenance conditions. This simulation 
will allow for a cost evaluation of the impact of sets of design guidelines simultaneously. 
E 
Task 4 includes an in-depth assessment of the other cost elements as well as the variable 
costs which were previously assessed. The sensitivity of cost to reductions in MTTF or 
design life specifications will be quantitatively evaluated. This will include the reduction of 
design analysis, test and program schedule. The cost savings associated with retrieval andU 	 refurbishment, which should be of significance due to the large investment in spacecraft and 
telescope cost elements, will also be evaluated in this task. 
U 
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